Volume 59, Issue 6

Page 1613

Stanford
Law Review
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WITHIN THE FIRM

Samuel W. Buell

© 2007 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University, from the
Stanford Law Review at 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613 (2007). For information visit
http://lawreview.stanford.edu.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WITHIN THE FIRM
Samuel W. Buell*
It seems improbable that the theoretical and doctrinal framework of
criminal procedure, developed mostly through a binary model of the individual
and the state, would fit without modification in the tripartite model of the state,
the firm, and the individual that characterizes the investigation and sanctioning
of criminal conduct within legal entities. This intuition—which has been
underexplored in spite of heated public debate about the state’s practices in this
area—proves correct. I develop some components of a framework for
understanding procedure for individual cases of criminal wrongdoing within
firms and generating insights to guide reform. The process of pursuing individual
cases within firms (as opposed to firm cases against firms) is distinctive for at
least three reasons: in terms of causation and incentives, the presence of an
organization materially alters the incidence of individual misconduct ex ante and
the efficiency and efficacy of investigating and prosecuting that conduct ex post;
the nature of the applicable substantive criminal violations (white collar crimes)
causes such cases to ripen into criminal cases more slowly than those outside
business firms; and lawyers have multiple roles in such cases not only ex post but
also ex ante. I evaluate two current practices in light of these structural
differences: state use of the fruits of employer coercion of employees’ waivers of
the right to silence; and state negotiation with firms over the scope of firms’
indemnification of their agents for litigation costs. I conclude that some reforms
of current practices in these areas would be beneficial but that calls for abolition
of those practices are misguided.
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INTRODUCTION
The law and basic commitments of criminal procedure, though subject to
unending contest at their margins, are reasonably mature. They have developed
mostly in terms of a binary model of the individual’s relationship to the state
and its enforcement personnel. This model naturally leaves a gap. When the
state investigates and prosecutes crime committed within legal organizations—
that is, crime on the job—a third player, the legal entity, is present. The
presence of a legal entity implies the need for a tripartite model and generates
the intuition that existing theory and doctrine about criminal procedure might
be incomplete or inadequate for this setting.
Insufficient attention has been paid to basic structural differences that
distinguish the process by which the state pursues imposition of criminal
sanctions on an individual who violates the law on the job from the process by
which the state deals with crime “on the street.”1 Both the state and the
individual face special problems when encountering each other within the
setting of the firm. To determine what procedures are necessary for the state to
accomplish regulatory objectives and for the individual to receive due
protections, the nature and implications of this setting must be understood.
Voluminous literatures grapple with the imposition of civil and criminal
enterprise liability on firms and with the relationship between the individual
1. An exception is Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the
Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295 (2001). Brown, however,
principally compares the normative dimensions of substantive wrongdoing involved in street
and corporate crime (and prevailing social norms about them), rather than contrasting
problems of procedural law.
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and the state when the individual acts at large. Little has been written about the
application of criminal procedure to the individual who acts within a legal
organization.
The state is increasingly active in the pursuit of “corporate wrongdoing,” a
term that elides the distinction between wrongdoing by people within firms and
wrongdoing by firms—or, more precisely, the attribution of individual
wrongdoing to firms for sanctioning purposes. Given the increase in state
activity and the lack of careful attention to the particular problem of criminal
procedure within firms (as opposed to against them),2 it should not be
surprising that public controversy has erupted and that the ensuing discussion
has, to date, been shallow and even shrill.3
In broad terms, business firms and the organized corporate bar are waging
a sustained campaign of public criticism of the state (primarily, but not
exclusively, the federal government), focused on the claim that criminal
prosecutors and civil regulators have been overreaching in matters of procedure
within firms by using their charging and settlement leverage to eliminate all
manner of impediments to information gathering. The critics have not been
precise about what they see as the problem with the state’s current enforcement
methodologies. Sometimes the charge seems to be that the state is doing
violence to basic procedural protections for the individual—that is, treating the
firm’s agent unfairly, either generally or in relation to the actor on the street. At
other times, the charge seems to be that the state is tilting the adversary process
between itself and firms out of balance, by depriving firms of information
control and bargaining power—presumably (though this is rarely specified)
resulting in undesirable risk of errors in the legal system.4
2. Cf. Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Defendants and the Protections of Criminal
Procedure: An Economic Analysis (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law &
Econ. Working Paper Series No. 29, 2004), available at http://law.bepress.com/umichlwps/
olin/art29 (considering the desirability of criminal procedure rules as applied to firms
themselves).
3. See, e.g., George Ellard, Making the Silent Speak and the Informed Wary, 42 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 985, 991 (2005) (arguing that government policy is “moving the process
governing the American system away from the form the Founders expressly meant it to
take—an accusatorial system—and toward something they feared—an inquisitorial
system”); John F. Lauro, Protecting Corporate Employees: The Need for a New Bill of
Rights, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 17, 2006, at 4 (urging state legislatures to enact a “Corporate
Employees Bill of Rights”); Martin S. Pinales, Standing up for Corporations, CHAMPION,
Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 4, 9 (“Using the fiction of the company to violate rights of individuals is
unacceptable . . . .”); see also The Thompson Memorandum’s Effect on the Right to Counsel
in Corporate Investigations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
(2006) (statement of Karen J. Mathis, President, American Bar Association) (objecting to
policy “that erodes employees’ constitutional and other legal rights”).
4. Some of the recent broad-brush rhetoric about erosion of the right to counsel or
erosion of the right to silence appears, when invoked on behalf of business firms, to be a
reversion to outdated modes of thinking. At approximately the turn of the nineteenth century,
the American legal system, in its early efforts to grapple with the modern business
enterprise, mostly eschewed the idea that firms can or should be equated to people for rights-
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With more clarity, the critics have described three specific procedural
practices as objectionable and their complaints have triggered measures to
change law and policy in those areas. The practices are state use of the fruits of
employer coercion of employees to waive their rights to silence, state
negotiation with firms over firms’ indemnification of their agents for litigation
costs, and state negotiation with firms over the scope of firms’ assertions and
waiver of their attorney-client privilege. The reform measures are two-fold at
present. Senator Arlen Specter recently introduced a bill in Congress designed
to prohibit the state from pursuing, encouraging, or making use of the fruits of
any of these three practices.5 Shortly thereafter, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) issued new guidelines (known as the “McNulty Memo”), revising its
practices for how federal prosecutors handle organizational criminal cases, in
ways designed to reduce the incidence of two of the three practices (privilege
waivers and negotiation over firms’ indemnification of their agents).6
In this Article, I have two objectives. My first goal is to establish what I
see as the most useful orientation for evaluating procedural practices involved
in the state’s pursuit of individual wrongdoing within firms. I will demonstrate
that the firm setting for criminal procedure is analytically distinct for several
reasons, including that the phenomenon of wrongdoing itself differs in how it
occurs within firms; that the state faces unique obstacles to the detection and
proof of wrongdoing when it occurs within firms; that the kinds of wrongdoing
that typically occur within business firms take substantially longer for the legal
system to sort out than “ordinary,” or street, crime; and that a key actor in the
legal process—counsel—has multiple and very different functions in the firm
setting.
Taken together, these characteristics of legal violations within firms lead to
the conclusion that any effort to equate “ordinary” criminal procedure with
criminal procedure within firms, or to attempt to simply transpose the doctrine

bearing purposes. See William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure,
105 YALE L.J. 393, 421-33 (1995).
5. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong. (2007); see
also Margaret Aulino, House Subcommittee Wants to Bolster Means to Combat Forced
Waiver of Privilege, 39 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 419 (Mar. 19, 2007).
6. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
to Heads of Department Components and U.S. Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution
of Business Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty Memo], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf. The previous guidelines,
consisting of written directives from the Deputy Attorney General to all federal prosecutors,
were known after its author as the “Thompson Memo.” Memorandum from Larry D.
Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Department
Components and U.S. Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memo], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business_organizations.pdf. Before that, the guidelines were
known as the “Holder Memo.” Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys, Bringing Criminal
Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999).
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and practices associated with the street to the firm, is a mistake. Not only is the
social setting distinctive but so is the legal landscape: the individual’s
relationship to the state in the criminal process is ordinarily thought to be
mediated by the Constitution as well as by statutes and rules purposely directed
at criminal procedure; in the firm context, the state’s pursuit of criminal
sanctioning is controlled by a wider array of rules, norms, and incentives,
including privilege law, substantive and vicarious liability regimes, contractual
arrangements, economic incentives, and the nature of the firm.
My second objective is to demonstrate how seeing these differences in
context reduces worry about the state’s current practices and leads to a response
to the calls for reform that, at most, would modestly restrain the state in some
respects. To accomplish this, I will examine the two points of controversy that
most directly concern the position of the individual in the criminal process
within firms: the treatment of statements and their Fifth Amendment
implications, and firms’ indemnification of their agents for litigation costs. In
terms of law, my conclusions will be that efforts to prohibit state involvement
in these matters, including Senator Specter’s bill, are seriously misguided and
that the DOJ’s recent changes to its policy controlling corporate investigations
are inadequate in some respects and overly reactive in others.
My discussion will proceed as follows. In Part I, I will describe in more
detail the public debate and the three issues of doctrine and practice that most
trouble firms and their advocates at present. In Part II, I will describe the
distinctive landscape on which wrongdoing within firms occurs and is
sanctioned, by examining the three most salient structural features
distinguishing the firm setting: the causal influence of firms on the incidence
and sanctioning of crime; the slow maturation of criminal cases involving
sophisticated economic activity; and the multiple roles performed by lawyers,
both ex ante and ex post, with regard to actual and potential misconduct within
firms.
In Part III, I will closely examine two of the issues of law and policy
involved in current debate. First, I will consider the treatment of individuals’
statements, particularly those resulting from employer coercion of employees to
waive the right to silence and the state’s encouragement of, and use of the fruits
of, such compulsion. Second, I will deal with the state’s involvement in firms’
funding and selection of individual counsel. In each case, I will derive
conclusions about desirable law and policy from consideration of the structural
features of investigating wrongdoing within firms developed in Part II.
In Part IV, I will briefly address three important issues that cannot, but also
need not, receive full treatment in this Article: the overbreadth of the law of
criminal enterprise liability; the question of which institutions should make
legal policy in this context; and one issue of doctrine and practice that is at the
center of current debate but does not directly involve the procedural position of
the individual rather than the firm—that is, the state’s encouragement of firms
to waive attorney-client privilege and work-product claims.
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I. THE DEBATE AND ITS THREE CHIEF ISSUES
Critics assert that the state, principally through the DOJ but also through
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and other regulators, has
routinized three practices in the investigation of wrongdoing within firms that
are troubling enough to call for their being severely limited if not banned. All
three affect the ease with which the state accesses forms of information about
individual conduct within business enterprises.
First, the state causes (critics might prefer “forces”) employers to coerce
their employees into waiving the employees’ rights under the Fifth Amendment
to refuse to make statements. The culprits here are written policies of the DOJ
and SEC that say the state should consider, in the mix of factors affecting its
charging and settlement discretion, an organization’s de jure and de facto
policy with regard to requiring employees to answer questions in regulatory
matters put by both the employer and the state.7
Second, the state encourages (critics might prefer “requires”) firms to
provide the state, through the mechanism of waiver, with probative materials
that would otherwise be shielded from disclosure by firms’ attorney-client
privileges and the work-product doctrine. These materials have importance to
the state because of two phenomena now routine in the affairs of business
enterprises. First, in-house and outside counsel are ubiquitous in the
transactional activities of firms, so legal advice or services are often an
important part of the factual context for the activity being examined. Second,
firms routinely use counsel (usually outside counsel) to conduct internal
investigations of potential violations of the law and other misconduct. For
many years, the state responded to these phenomena by pursuing policies that
encouraged firms, through the exercise of the state’s charging and settlement
discretion, to waive attorney-client privilege and work-product protections that
would otherwise shield transaction-related communications involving lawyers
and investigative information gathered by counsel ex post.8
Third, the state takes intrusive positions about whether, or under what
circumstances, firms ought to indemnify agents who engage in wrongdoing for
those agents’ litigation costs, particularly attorneys’ fees. The SEC published
its conclusion in one recent enforcement action that a company’s expansion of
the scope of employees who could be indemnified against the consequences of
the SEC’s action “without being required to do so by state law or its corporate

7. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency
Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44,969, 76 SEC Docket 220 (Oct. 23,
2001) [hereinafter Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a)], available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm; McNulty Memo, supra note 6, at
7; Thompson Memo, supra note 6, at 6-8.
8. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a), supra note 7; Thompson Memo,
supra note 6, at 7.
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charter” was a factor causing the SEC to find that the company had failed
adequately to cooperate in the inquiry.9 Until late 2006, the DOJ policy on
charging firms with criminal violations provided that a prosecutor “may”
consider in her charging and settlement discretion whether a “corporation
appears to be protecting its culpable employees and agents” including,
“depending on the circumstances, . . . through the advancing of attorneys
fees.”10
Over the past two years, these three practices have caused an uproar among
corporate actors and the corporate bar.11 It is not clear whether protest is driven
by changes in the nature of the state’s practices on the ground, an increase in
the number of organizational investigations, a shift in the relevant political
environment, or something else. The evidence is mixed, for example, on
whether the state had moved to enforcing a “culture of waiver” in corporate
investigations when previously privilege waivers were requested rarely or in
more limited fashion, as the critics charged.12
9. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Lucent Settles SEC Enforcement Action
Charging the Company with $1.1 Billion Accounting Fraud (May 17, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-67.htm.
10. Thompson Memo, supra note 6, at 7-8. The policy noted that a corporation’s
compliance with a state law mandate to provide indemnification could not be considered an
instance of such protection. Id. at 8 n.4.
11. See, e.g., ABA TASK FORCE ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES ON AUDIT ISSUES 1-3 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/
buslaw/attorneyclient/home.shtml [hereinafter ABA REPORT ON AUDIT ISSUES]; ABA TASK
FORCE ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES ON
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 6, 14 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/
home.shtml [hereinafter ABA REPORT ON EMPLOYEE RIGHTS]; COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS.
REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT 86 (2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/
11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf (“[The DOJ should] revise its prosecutorial
guidelines to prohibit federal prosecutors from seeking . . . the denial of attorneys’ fees to
employees, officers, or directors.”); id. at 91 (“[The SEC should] revers[e] its longstanding
position that indemnification of directors for damages awarded in Section 11 actions is
against public policy . . . .”); see also sources cited supra note 3. It should be noted that the
bar labors under a conflict of interest when arguing about reform related to the attorneyclient privilege. A robust privilege improves the market for legal services. See Louis Kaplow
& Stephen Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and
Social Desirability, 102 HARV. L. REV. 565, 599 (1989).
12. Compare AM. CHEMISTRY COUNCIL ET AL., THE DECLINE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT: SURVEY RESULTS 2-3 (2006), available at
http://www.acca.com/Surveys/attyclient2.pdf
(reporting
that
after
mailing
a
(methodologically unsound) survey exclusively to corporate and defense counsel titled “Is
the Attorney-Client Privilege Under Attack?,” nearly 75% of respondents agreed with the
survey’s proposition that there is a “culture of waiver”), with Lonnie T. Brown, Jr.,
Reconsidering the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Response to the CompelledVoluntary Waiver Paradox, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 897, 899 & nn.7-9 (2006) (noting
disagreement about the empirical question). It is remarkable that some of the materials from
critics, given their source, make glaring errors (or, worse, engage in obfuscation) with regard
to the distinction between organizational and individual counsel. See, e.g., ABA REPORT ON
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 3, 5 (stating that government policies of seeking waiver
of corporations’ privileged materials “have contributed to an erosion of . . . individual rights”
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In any event, the protest has been heard. Senator Specter recently
introduced legislation that seeks to bar all federal officials, in the exercise of
their charging and settlement discretion, from considering a firm’s willingness
to require its employees to answer questions in regulatory matters, to waive
privilege and work-product protections, or to forego indemnifying employees
for attorneys’ fees.13 More or less coincident with this legislation, the DOJ
issued new guidelines governing the conduct of its prosecutors in investigations
of business enterprises.14 The new prosecution guidelines (the “McNulty
Memo”) speak to two of the three issues that have troubled critics.
With regard to privilege waivers, the McNulty Memo replaces the previous
general guidance that waiver is desirable but not dispositive15 with more
specific guidance. The McNulty Memo says that waiver is not a “prerequisite”
to a finding that a firm has cooperated in an investigation but that waiver “may

and “are violative of the rights of employees”). Some evidence of disingenuousness is
apparent in the recent news that corporate counsel oppose a proposed amendment to the
Federal Rules of Evidence (proposed Rule 502, governing selective waiver) that would
protect firms from privilege waivers as to private litigants in instances of waiver with respect
to the state. Reportedly, the reason for the objection is that the existence of a protective rule
on selective waiver would deprive counsel of the argument that a firm should not have to
waive as to the state due to the collateral consequences of that waiver on the firm’s position
with other adversaries. See J.P. Finet, Attorney-Client Privilege: Selective Waiver of
Privilege Provision Likely to Be Pulled from Proposed Rule of Evidence, [2007] Corp.
Accountability & Fraud Daily (BNA) d8 (Jan. 31, 2007).
13. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007).
This bill seeks to add to the United States Code the following language:
(b) IN GENERAL.—In any Federal investigation or criminal or civil enforcement matter, an
agent or attorney of the United States shall not—
(1) demand, request, or condition treatment on the disclosure by an organization, or
person affiliated with that organization, of any communication protected by the
attorney-client privilege or any attorney work product;
(2) condition a civil or criminal charging decision relating to a organization, or person
affiliated with that organization, on, or use as a factor in determining whether an
organization, or person affiliated with that organization, is cooperating with the
Government—
...
(B) the provision of counsel to, or contribution to the legal defense expenses of,
an employee of that organization;
...
(E) a failure to terminate the employment of or otherwise sanction any employee
of that organization because of the decision by that employee to exercise the
constitutional rights or other legal protections of that employee in response to a
Government request . . . .

Id.; see also COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 11 (“[The DOJ should]
revise its prosecutorial guidelines to prohibit federal prosecutors from seeking waivers of the
attorney-client privilege . . . .”).
14. McNulty Memo, supra note 6.
15. Thompson Memo, supra note 6, at 7 (“One factor the prosecutor may weigh in
assessing the adequacy of a corporation’s cooperation is the completeness of its disclosure
including, if necessary, a waiver of the attorney-client and work product protections, both
with respect to its internal investigation and with respect to communications between
specific officers, directors and employees and counsel.”).
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expedite” an investigation.16 It authorizes prosecutors to request a waiver only
where there is “legitimate need” in an investigation, assessed by considering
whether the information sought is beneficial and cannot be obtained another
way, and whether the firm has otherwise fully disclosed relevant facts and
would not suffer undue collateral consequences from waiver.17
The McNulty Memo permits prosecutors to consider a firm’s response to a
waiver request in the exercise of their discretion if the request is for “purely
factual information . . . relating to the underlying misconduct.”18 It bars
prosecutors from considering a firm’s rejection of a waiver request if the
request is for “attorney-client communications or non-factual attorney work
product” (while saying that such requests should be made “only in rare
circumstances”); however, it says prosecutors “may always favorably consider”
a firm’s agreement to such a request.19
With regard to indemnification, critics’ concerns crystallized in a
prosecution involving KPMG, the auditing and consulting firm, in which Judge
Lewis Kaplan of the Southern District of New York threatened to dismiss an
indictment after finding that prosecutors stated to the firm that their charging
discretion would be influenced by whether the firm chose to continue to pay
attorneys’ fees for agents for whom the firm was not obligated to do so.20
Probably in response to Judge Kaplan’s opinion, the Specter Bill, and a chorus
16. McNulty Memo, supra note 6, at 8.
17. Id. at 8-9.
18. Id. at 9.
19. Id. at 10.
20. Judge Kaplan found this conduct of the government to be virtually unconstitutional
under the Sixth Amendment’s counsel guarantee. United States v. Stein (Stein I), 435 F.
Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). I say “virtually” because Judge Kaplan did not actually do
anything to the state or its case, perhaps because the constitutional basis for a dismissal or
other remedy was lacking. Compare id. at 336 (“[The government] has violated the
Constitution it is sworn to defend.”), with id. at 380 (stating that, in light of the court’s
conclusions, the government now “may” use its leverage to cause defendants’ employer to
advance defense costs “in order to avoid any risk of dismissal of this indictment or other
unpalatable relief”). See infra text accompanying notes 140-41, 166. Instead, Judge Kaplan
invited the defendants to file a civil suit, over which he has exercised “ancillary” jurisdiction,
compelling KPMG to fund their defenses, on a theory of implied contract based on KPMG’s
past pattern of paying the attorneys’ fees of its agents. Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 382; see
also Complaint for Advancement, Stein v. KPMG LLP, No. 1:06-cv-5007-LAK (S.D.N.Y.
July 10, 2006) (complaint in ancillary civil action), available at 2006 WL 2922089. New
York courts at least would seem to frown on an implied contract theory in this context.
Hooper Assocs. v. AGS Computers, Inc., 548 N.E.2d 903, 905 (N.Y. 1989) (stating that
agreement to indemnify for attorneys’ fees will not be implied between contracting parties
absent “unmistakably clear” contractual language). Judge Kaplan has delayed trial of the
criminal case pending resolution of the civil fee litigation. KPMG has appealed Judge
Kaplan’s ruling that its fee dispute with its employees is not subject to mandatory arbitration.
United States v. Stein (Stein III), 452 F. Supp. 2d 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (denying KPMG’s
motion to dismiss civil claim relating to advancement of attorneys’ fees as precluded by
contractual obligation to submit to binding arbitration, and setting case for jury trial); KPMG
Will Appeal a Legal-Fees Case, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2006, at C6.
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of criticism from the corporate bar, the DOJ has changed its policy with regard
to indemnification. The McNulty Memo provides that a prosecutor “generally
should not take into account” in exercising her discretion whether a firm is
advancing litigation costs to any individual.21 Advancement may be considered
only with the approval of the Deputy Attorney General and only in an
“extremely rare case[]” in which a firm uses advancement as a means to
impede an investigation.22
Finally, with regard to employer policies about employees’ obligations
to answer questions in regulatory matters, the DOJ did not explicitly address
this point when it recently modified its policy.23 Nor has the SEC spoken
recently on this subject—or, for that matter, on the other issues that trouble
critics.24 The DOJ’s recent moves have not mollified the critics,25 and at least
some in Congress have said that Senator Specter’s bill does not go far enough
because it lacks enforcement measures to control prosecutors.26 The SEC’s
inaction also remains a point of serious objection among critics.
II. THE DISTINCTIVE SETTING OF THE FIRM
At least three distinguishing characteristics of firms, wrongdoing within
firms, and the investigation of wrongdoing within firms are important in
understanding procedure for pursuing crime within firms. In this Part, I will
fully describe these three features: the effects of firms on the incidence of crime
ex ante and its detection ex post; the slow ripening of criminal cases in the firm
context; and the multiple roles of counsel in such cases. In Part III, I will then
apply these features to the current controversies of law and policy described in
Part I.

21. McNulty Memo, supra note 6, at 11.
22. Id. at 11 n.3.
23. Compare McNulty Memo, supra note 6, at 7 (stating that a prosecutor may gauge
extent of corporation’s cooperation in part by considering corporation’s “willingness to
provide relevant evidence”), with Thompson Memo, supra note 6, at 6 (stating that a
prosecutor may gauge extent of corporation’s cooperation in part by considering
corporation’s “willingness . . . to make witnesses available”).
24. See ABA Asks SEC to Revise Policy on Waiver of Lawyer/Client Privilege, 39 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 284 (Feb. 26, 2007); Rachel McTague, Attorney-Client Privilege:
Former SEC Enforcement Official Says McNulty Memo Will Not Alter SEC Policy, 5 Corp.
Accountability Report (BNA) 81 (Jan. 26, 2007).
25. Pamela A. MacLean, No Comfort from DOJ Waiver Rule: “McNulty Memo” on
Attorney-Client Privilege Blasted by Critics, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 22, 2007, at 8; see, e.g., David
Douglass & Carlean Ponder, Exceptions to the McNulty Memo: Do They Render the
Revisions Illusory?, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME REP., Feb. 27, 2007, at 2.
26. See Aulino, supra note 5.

April 2007]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WITHIN THE FIRM

1623

A. Causation and Sanctioning of Criminal Wrongdoing
The first step in understanding criminal procedure within the firm is to
describe the nature of the problem facing the state when it deals with violations
of the law within firms. After all, questions about whether procedural restraints
and protections are necessary, adequate, and effective only arise (at least in an
interesting way) because there is a public concern that gives serious cause for
the state to be intrusive. Wrongdoing within firms has two chief distinguishing
characteristics for the legal system: firms causally affect the incidence of
wrongdoing ex ante, and they contribute to or detract from the effectiveness of
detection and sanctioning ex post.
1. Causation and ex ante effects
There is no such thing as an organization committing a crime. Firms don’t
commit crimes; people do.27 However, an organization may bear an important
causal relationship to its agent’s criminal act by virtue of a variety of
behavioral phenomena. One is economic incentives. Employees who seek to
enhance their earnings and prestige may pursue organizational objectives, such
as increased profits or higher stock prices, through criminal acts that the
employees believe will cost less than the benefits that will flow from those
acts.28 In such an instance, an individual may commit a crime that she would
not have committed but for her participation in the organization. An
organization may influence the degree to which an agent rationally elects to
pursue criminal conduct through direct and indirect incentives, even though
those incentives may (indeed, virtually always do) fall short of a direct award
for criminal behavior.29
As subjects of deterrence efforts, actors in organizational settings are also
different than actors outside organizations. Most organizational actors have
control of organizational resources but not ownership of them (or at least as
much of them as they control). Separation of ownership and control means that
27. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct:
An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 695 (1997).
28. But see Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of
Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REV. 315, 319 (1991) (arguing that though corporate crime
sometimes benefits firms, it is a mistake to treat management criminality as altruistic toward
shareholders since “[t]he real aim of criminal behavior by organizations is to advance the
careers of the responsible corporate actors”).
29. A straightforward example would be managers who engage in accounting fraud in
a firm that heavily rewards its managers for attaining earnings targets without regard to how
they are attained. Such rewards do not inevitably lead to criminality; routinely, they do not.
However, in many cases in which accounting fraud does occur, the firm’s reward structure is
an essential part of the causal structure of the crime. Of course, some agents, fearing
personal liability, may engage in less risk-taking than their principals would desire, but such
instances do not mobilize legal regimes and their procedural components because, by
definition, they involve no occasion for sanction.
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actors can draw upon firm resources to engage in (and profit from) activities
that generate harm, while those same resources are unavailable to the legal
system through imposition of individual liability on the actor. The individual
actor thus may be insolvent in relation to the sanction needed to deter a
particular instance of wrongdoing within a firm.30
Beyond rational response to employer incentives, people behave differently
in groups. Group forces make wrongdoing more likely to arise and can make it
more virulent once it begins.31 Groups also differ along this dimension. Some
organizations have cultures that constrain these tendencies and strongly
promote legal compliance. No legal entity has an express policy of encouraging
criminality, but some undoubtedly have cultures that enable and even promote
an aggressive posture toward legal constraints, or do not condemn or punish
misconduct unless it is detected publicly.32
Firms are also characterized by team production.33 The effect of this
phenomenon on criminality is one of the principal insights motivating the law
of conspiracy.34 When the labor in criminality is divided, criminality is likely
to be more effective and to cause greater harm. A crime in an organization
therefore may present a greater threat to society than a similar crime committed
by an individual outside the organizational setting.35 Even where the tangible
or measurable effect of a crime is the same inside versus outside an
organization, an organizational crime may be more socially detrimental by
virtue of the visibility and influence of organizations in society, that is, their
expressive power. People may conclude more about the state of the social and
moral fabric, and their confidence in markets and public institutions may be
affected, from their observation of an instance of organizational versus isolated
individual wrongdoing.36

30. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996) (examining
extensively how judgment proofing at both individual and enterprise levels can thwart
liability regimes).
31. I described social science literature relevant to this point in Samuel W. Buell, The
Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 493-98 (2006).
32. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. Blader, Can Businesses Effectively Regulate
Employee Conduct? The Antecedents of Rule Following in Work Settings, 48 ACAD. MGMT.
J. 1143 (2005); Eric Van den Steen, On the Origin of Shared Beliefs (and Corporate
Culture) (MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 4553-05, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=793884.
33. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 265-76 (1999).
34. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1316-24, 135558 (2003).
35. I mean to limit this point to an observation about the relative effects of the same
form of criminal liability. I do not mean to engage with the difficult debate over which
harms society more: a financial crime depriving, for example, tens of thousands of people of
substantial wealth or even livelihood versus a violent crime, for example, depriving one
person of her life or inflicting lasting physical and psychic harm.
36. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J.
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2. Detection and ex post effects
Ex post, the overlay of an organization in a case of criminality makes the
detection and proof of crime more difficult for the state.37 Private organizations
are relatively opaque, the more so the larger and more sophisticated they are.
Layers of hierarchy must be penetrated to reach principal actors. Division of
labor makes ascription of responsibility for conduct and results challenging.38
Organizational activities are often by nature highly complex, involving
technologically advanced and specialized means of production that are difficult
for outsiders to understand. And the mere presence of the firm implies an
additional (and resource-rich) actor who may choose to expend effort to
interfere with the state’s project of identifying and proving wrongdoing. All of
this adds up to a more difficult project for the state than the “ordinary” criminal
case. The modern organizational case can easily involve hundreds of witnesses,
millions of documents, and years of investigation requiring the labor of dozens
of state actors.
3. Enterprise liability
Enterprise liability has been the legal system’s chief response to both
problems: how firms incentivize their agents ex ante to comply with or violate
the law, and how firms impede or assist the state in detecting and sanctioning
violations ex post. The insight that imposing sanctions at the level of the group
is a means of causing the group to control its members and counteract its own
tendencies to push its members in the wrong direction is a very old one.39 As
the modern organization has grown in size and sophistication and become
ubiquitous, the insight has become more firmly entrenched in law and theory.40
When the law threatens a firm with sanctions for its agent’s violation of the
law, it provides the firm with an incentive to (1) deter wrongdoing through
incentives directed at agents (both carrots and sticks); (2) detect and stop
wrongdoing before it grows and matures by monitoring agent conduct; and (3)
LEGAL STUD. 609, 618-22 (1998).
37. These problems are discussed in greater detail in Darryl K. Brown, The
Problematic and Faintly Promising Dynamics of Corporate Crime Enforcement, 1 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 521, 526-29 (2004).
38. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between
Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1345, 1370 (1982).
39. See Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345 (2003).
40. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 27, at 689. Note that enterprise liability may
encourage organizations to control employees through a variety of mechanisms. Belief in the
utility of enterprise liability does not require belief that agents are motivated to comply with
rules only by the threat of employer sanctions. The specter of enterprise liability may also
cause an organization to take steps to promote a normative culture of voluntary compliance
and deference to rules. See Tyler & Blader, supra note 32, at 1146-54 (discussing research
showing that tapping into employees’ social values may be a more effective organizational
strategy for inducing compliance).
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develop evidence of wrongdoing after it occurs to facilitate sanctioning by the
state.41
The firm has decided advantages over the state in the control and
monitoring of the behavior of individuals who act within firms. The firm is
much closer to the action, better educated about the activities under scrutiny,
and a more efficient user of enforcement resources.42 While the organization
does not have access to some means of sanctioning that the state enjoys (e.g.,
imprisonment), the organization can impose sanctions that the state cannot
(e.g., reduced compensation and firing). The state’s sanctions may be more
severe, but they are probably more remote in how they affect the calculus of
most agents contemplating violations of law.43
The effects of enterprise liability can be manifold. Sanctioning firms
causes them to sanction their own agents, which enhances deterrence both by
increasing overall sanctions and, more importantly, by increasing the
probability that some sanction will be imposed.44 Sanctioning firms in a
nuanced manner—for example, by modifying penalties according to a firm’s
efforts to detect and develop evidence of violations ex post—can ameliorate the
state’s special dilemmas in detecting and investigating violations of the law
when they occur within the opaque context of the firm.45 The firm can enhance

41. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 27, at 691, 699; Kornhauser, supra note 38, at
1351; Reinier Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93
YALE L.J. 857, 866-67 (1984); Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93
YALE L.J. 1231, 1241 (1984); see also Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of
Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994) (exploring how enterprise
liability, if not carefully structured, can discourage firms from efforts to detect wrongdoing).
42. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 27, at 692-93, 700-01; Kornhauser, supra note 38,
at 1351.
43. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the
Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949,
954-55 (2003).
44. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 27, at 706-07.
45. Id. at 695-741; Arlen, supra note 41, at 861-66; see also IAN AYRES & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992)
(advancing theory of “responsive regulation” of firms based on “enforcement pyramid”
involving levels of regulation of varying severity and public-private control). I recognize two
important complications to this account, though I do not think they vitiate these relatively
well-settled insights. First, agency costs may reduce the extent to which firms respond to
enterprise liability in the way we would expect. When managers making decisions for a firm
are actually or potentially exposed to individual liability, they may steer the firm away from
responses to enterprise liability that are in the firm’s interests. See Brandon L. Garrett,
Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 34, on file
with author) (“[C]ases where the current leadership of the organization shared a role itself in
the wrongdoing” may not settle because “reforms may require purging the leadership and
fundamentally changing the organizational mission.”). For detailed and colorful accounts of
recent such instances, see Peter Elkind, The Law Firm of Hubris Hypocrisy and Greed,
FORTUNE, Nov. 13, 2006, at 154, and James Bandler & Charles Forelle, Interested Parties:
In Internal Probes of Stock Options, Conflicts Abound, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2006, at A1.
Second, Coasean theory would hold that contractual bargaining between firms and agents
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sanctioning effects in two ways: by policing its own agents and punishing them
economically, and by sharing the products of its policing efforts with the state
to assist the public project of imposing legal sanctions.
None of this is to deny that harnessing organizations in this fashion might
carry costs that outweigh any social benefits, but determining whether that
hypothesis is accurate requires a weighing of costs and benefits in the context
of the particular legal incentive under consideration. Appreciating the effects of
the firm on individual wrongdoing, ex ante and ex post, should be a starting
point for any such discussion.
B. Slow Ripening of Substantive Liability
Effects of the firm aside, crime within firms is different because, in
general, the substantive crimes committed in organizational settings are white
collar offenses, a distinctive variety of crime for analytical purposes.46 If in the
ordinary firm case, the matter in question were an agent’s commission of a
crime of violence on the job (such as murdering an employee who had
threatened to reveal a price-fixing conspiracy), it would be fairly clear early in
the process that a crime had been committed. The principal challenge for the
legal system would be collection of sufficient, admissible proof of the crime.
Perhaps the system would confront a challenge of determining and proving
perpetrator identity, though this is less likely in the organizational context
where documents and eyewitnesses tend to be more prevalent than on the street
or in the home.
When the substantive wrong involves fraud or other forms of harmful
deception, however, often the primary issue for the legal system is determining
whether a crime has been committed.47 Especially in complex organizational
settings, the wrongdoing can be deeply nested within legitimate and valuable
economic activity. And the more sophisticated the fraud, the more difficult it is
to identify as fraud (which is, in essence, the wrong of taking or attempting to
take another’s property by deceptive means structured so as not to fall within
the basic prohibition against theft).48 Fraudulent conduct evolves along with
economic sophistication. What once was skewing weights and measures has
can undo any incentives the legal system adopts to compel firms to detect and punish agent
wrongdoing. It seems doubtful that agents have the ability to demand extra wages to offset
their expected costs of committing criminal acts, especially wages to offset steps an
employer might take to increase the probability of sanction. Of course, agents also have no
realistic ability to bargain for wages to offset the extreme disutility of an imprisonment
sanction.
46. Stuart P. Green, Moral Ambiguity in White Collar Criminal Law, 18 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 501 (2004); Stuart P. Green, The Concept of White Collar Crime
in Law and Legal Theory, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2004).
47. William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1873, 1883-86
(2000).
48. Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1973 (2006).
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become complex manipulation of accounting conventions to misrepresent the
earnings of public corporations.49
The legal system has responded to the challenge of white collar crime in
two ways. On one hand, it adopts extremely open-textured criminal
prohibitions, such as antifraud statutes, that do not define the prohibited
conduct with specificity, so as to remain applicable to innovative wrongdoing.
On the other hand, it insists on locating culpability for violation of those opentextured prohibitions through deep inquiry into mental state. Mens rea both
dominates the law of white collar crime and is distinctive there in relation to
other precincts of criminal law. Inquiry into mental state in white collar cases
often progresses past relatively thin cognitive states like the Model Penal
Code’s “knowledge” or “purpose” to concepts such as “willfulness,” “bad
purpose,” and “consciousness of wrongdoing.”50 Inquiry into mistake of law
also appears here more prominently than elsewhere in the criminal law.51
Even with this searching inquiry into mental state, the enforcer retains an
exceptionally wide range of discretion in white collar cases. The law in this
area strains to decisively mark out the boundary between civil and criminal
sanctioning.52 The state makes decisions case by case, often after a searching
inquiry into the facts, about what to treat as a crime and what to leave for civil
regulation. The civil versus criminal question is often debated and negotiated in
a kind of pre-charging litigation that involves regulated actors, their counsel,
and state enforcers acting as quasi-adjudicators.53
Most cases within firms ripen slowly. The question of whether the case is a
criminal case at all often is not and cannot be determined until long after the
machinery of criminal justice has been activated. This means there is a kind of
procedural overbreadth. Criminal procedure may apply even where criminal
law does not: subpoenas may go out, grand juries may be convened, people
may be summoned for interviews with state regulators who carry guns and
badges, search warrants may be executed, and so on—even though it might turn
out in the end not just that no crime can be proved but that none was
committed. To be sure, momentum in major investigations often means that the
point of no return, at least from the perspective of the prosecutor, is passed
relatively early. However, even if it becomes clear early on that someone is
likely to be charged with something, the questions of who will be charged and

49. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1 cmt.2 (1962); Buell, supra note 48, at 1987-96;
see, e.g., United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 113-16 (2d Cir. 2006).
50. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962). These points are developed in more detail in
Buell, supra note 48, at 2031-36.
51. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994); Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of the
Law Is an Excuse—but Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127 (1997).
52. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”? Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991).
53. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2117, 2121-29 (1998).

April 2007]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WITHIN THE FIRM

1629

with what they will be charged are hotly contested, over a period of months or
even years, and often are not resolved until the very end of the investigative
process.
One might say that this is unremarkable. The regime of criminal procedure,
after all, is premised on the idea that one set of rules applies equally to the
innocent and the guilty.54 The point is to structure the game to operate fairly
prior to and apart from the question of whether the person subject to its
machinations is a criminal. This premise includes the assumption that there will
be cases in which the system goes through all its machinations only to discover
that “we haven’t got our man.”
But this is naïve. In candor, we “peek” all the time in criminal procedure,
even if it is not proper constitutional rhetoric to say so. For example, would the
punitive regime of pretrial detention that adheres in the federal courts be
tolerated if, on average, half or even twenty or thirty percent of charged persons
detained before trial were acquitted?55 The accuracy, speed, and clarity with
which the question of substantive liability is resolved (or, if you prefer, with
which we believe it to be resolved) undoubtedly affects the generosity of
procedural rights. The longer it takes to resolve the question of substantive
liability, and the more that question is subject to official discretion, the more
problematic it may be to mobilize the full panoply of criminal enforcement
powers early and in every case.
These concerns might cause one to want to pursue a separate regime of
criminal procedure for cases within business enterprises that favors the target of
state action more than the ordinary regime. But that is probably unpalatable
because it offends most people’s notions of equality. In any event, defending
the position that corporate actors are entitled to a kind of procedural set-off
against their substantive liability disadvantages would require taking on the
burden of evaluating the legal position of the corporate actor on a net basis.
While the open-textured and mens rea-based nature of substantive law may
disadvantage the corporate actor procedurally, that same actor has tremendous
resource advantages over the average subject of criminal proceedings.56 These
advantages affect procedural protections at their most fundamental level. For
example, one can easily view the quality of counsel as controlling the burden of
proof: a defendant with a better-funded lawyer is much more likely to persuade
a factfinder to entertain reasonable doubt.

54. See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1943).
55. See Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings: A Framework for Compensating Pretrial
Detainees, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 1954-75 (2005).
56. See William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L.
REV. 1903, 1951-52 (1993) (noting how broad substantive law of white collar crime
counteracts white collar defendants’ advantages in early access to counsel).
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C. Multiple Roles of Counsel
The role of counsel is a pillar in criminal procedure’s architecture but one
that tends to be conceived of in terms that do not fit the case within the firm.
Criminal procedure’s lawyer is the lawyer of Gideon and Strickland: the
constitutionally guaranteed, effective advocate who stands as a bulwark
between the individual and the state in an adversarial litigation to determine
criminal responsibility.57 Rhetoric and reality are vastly different in this
context, of course, but they both begin with the same conception of the
lawyer’s role.58
What is most notable about this lawyer, for my purposes, is that she arrives
on the scene fairly late. In general, her earliest appearance is to meet a client at
the police station.59 Most perpetrators of “ordinary” crimes lack the resources
to retain counsel prior to their criminal conduct, and have weak incentives to do
so. These actors tend to be overly optimistic about their risks of being caught,60
they probably realize that lawyers are prohibited from overtly counseling
clients about how to commit crimes without suffering sanctions, and they have
little need for help in understanding the relatively simple legal rules that apply
to their actions.61 Little can be accomplished by sharing criminal plans with a
lawyer, unless, of course, the lawyer is an accomplice.62 The one significant
exception to this model is the role of so-called “house counsel” to organized
crime groups.63
The lawyer of traditional criminal procedure—the accused’s lawyer—is
not absent in the firm case. But she arrives much earlier.64 Routinely, subjects
of state investigation learn early of the existence of the investigation, due to
57. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
58. See, e.g., Eve L. Brensike, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2007)
(manuscript at 7-9), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=942804.
59. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (stating that the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel applies only at critical stages after the initiation of adversarial proceedings).
60. Robinson & Darley, supra note 43, at 992-93.
61. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2003).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir. 1987).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 931-36 (2d Cir. 1993).
64. The distinctions in criminal cases between the traditional lawyer and the modern
organizational lawyer are thoroughly treated in Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational
Criminal Representation: The Changing Vision of the Right to Counsel, 105 HARV. L. REV.
670 (1992). See also Stuntz, supra note 56, at 1949 (stating that two forms of cases in which
defense lawyers get involved early are organized crime and white collar cases); Darryl K.
Brown, Executive-Branch Regulation of Criminal Defense Counsel and the Private Contract
Limit on Prosecutor Bargaining 15-16 (Wash. & Lee Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 2006-08, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=916546 (stating
that counsel in corporate cases, unlike counsel envisioned by right-to-counsel decisions,
arrive on the scene much earlier).
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subpoenas for documents, requests and subpoenas for witness statements, and
the like.65 And, as I discussed, this phase of the proceedings can last for months
or years. Many agents of large firms are compensated sufficiently to have the
resources to retain counsel early. It is worth their while to do so. Controlling
and monitoring the flow of evidence can benefit defendants when it comes time
to contest the state’s case on the merits, and often a defendant who controls
information will have opportunities to “win” the case before it gets started by
persuading the state not to pursue legal remedies.66
In addition, the lawyer for the accused (or the potentially accused) is joined
in the organizational case by another lawyer, who often arrives even earlier: the
attorney for the firm.67 Actually, two lawyers represent the firm.68 The
transactional lawyer supplies advice coincident with the conduct that is the
subject of investigation. Nowadays, it is not a stretch to say that counsel is
present for most significant corporate transactions. The role of this lawyer
includes both transaction facilitation (drafting documents, negotiating, and the
like) and counseling (determining if transactions violate the applicable
regulatory scheme, considering how they could be structured to avoid
sanctions, and so on).
The other organizational lawyer is the firm’s litigation attorney. This
lawyer is distinctive from the traditional lawyer of criminal procedure not only
because she arrives much earlier but also because she has a different client. Her
loyalties are, or should be, to the interests of the organization, not to its
employees or even the managers who direct her work.69 In some
circumstances, obligations to her firm client may require her to place managers
in legal jeopardy.70
Business enterprises, of course, have strong incentives to make use of
litigation counsel. Even more than individual counsel in such cases, firm
counsel can control and monitor the flow of information between the firm and
the state, vastly improving the firm’s position in negotiation and, if necessary,
litigation with the state.71 Firm counsel now routinely undertake investigation

65. See generally 1 OTTO G. OBERMAIER & ROBERT G. MORVILLO, WHITE COLLAR
CRIME: BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES §§ 1.01-.06 (2006); 2 id. §§ 13.04, 17.01-.07.
66. Lynch, supra note 53, at 2121-29.
67. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003).
68. For a thorough and incisive description of the special nature of organizational
counsel and its development as an institution, see JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE
PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 192-232 (2006).
69. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2003).
70. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (2007) (imposing a duty on attorneys practicing
before the SEC to report managers’ securities violations to corporate directors); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2003) (declaring that if organizational lawyer knows
manager is taking action in violation of obligation to organization, lawyer may take action in
response).
71. See, e.g., Robert S. Bennett et al., Internal Investigations and the Defense of
Corporations in the Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 62 BUS. LAW. 55, 58-87 (2006).
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of wrongdoing within firms, sometimes before the state has begun or even
considered an investigation of its own.72 These internal investigations have
several objectives: to enable the firm to conduct business, such as by
sanctioning its agents for wrongdoing and taking steps to prevent recurrence; to
situate the firm in a position of superior knowledge for decisionmaking and
advocacy in its dealings with regulators and, if necessary, courts; and to give
the firm factual materials that have value to regulators and can be used to
bargain over legal sanctions.
There is overlap, which is sometimes problematic, between the roles of the
lawyer for the accused and the litigation counsel for the firm. In the early stages
of a run-of-the-mill corporate internal investigation, neither the firm nor its
agent are likely to retain individual counsel for the agent. In the absence of
such individual counsel, the agent confronts a lawyer whose role can be
confusing.73 The firm’s lawyer is employed to help the firm address the same
problem of actual or potential legal sanctions that confronts the individual, and
the lawyer may appear to be aligned with the individual against the state. But
the firm’s best option for resolving that problem frequently involves sacrificing
the individual. Surely employees understand, in general, that employers
ferreting out information about misconduct in the workplace may take action
against employees who engage in wrongdoing. But employees may not
understand the extent to which the employer may be interested in assisting the
legal system in imposing sanctions. Rules of professional conduct ameliorate
this problem by requiring lawyers for the firm to make disclosures to
employees, but there is some evidence that these disclosure rules may not lead
to sufficient notice.74
72. See, e.g., Dan Hedges, Two Major Failings, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 2, 2006, at 23
(reporting actual or potential investigations into the backdating of stock option grants at
hundreds of corporations).
73. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 2 (2003) (stating that an
employee’s communications with the organization’s lawyer are covered by the
confidentiality rule but the employee is not the client and the lawyer may not disclose to the
employee information related to the representation of the organization except as necessary to
carry out representation of organization); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 163(2) cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997) (“A constituent may mistakenly
assume that the lawyer will act to further the personal interests of the constituent, perhaps
even against the interests of the organization.”).
74. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(f) (2003) (“[A] lawyer shall explain
the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
organization’s interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is
dealing.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 163(2) (Tentative
Draft No. 8, 1997) (“[W]hen the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
unrepresented non-client misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer must
make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding when failure to do so would
materially prejudice the non-client.”); Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate
Investigations: Legal Ethics, Professionalism and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 859; Bruce A. Green, Interviewing Corporate Client Officers and Employees:
Ethical Considerations, PROF’L LIABILITY LITIG. ALERT (ABA Prof’l Liab. Litig. Comm.,
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Even if (or when) individual counsel appears on the scene, the story about
the overlapping roles of lawyers remains complicated.75 Firms usually retain
and pay the fees of individual counsel in government regulatory matters. One
outside law firm typically serves as litigation counsel for the firm, while
another single firm (often recommended by the first) is retained to supply
representation for the employee-witnesses. Only when a conflict of interest
fully ripens (e.g., when one employee has been directly implicated in criminal
wrongdoing by another and has become an investigative “target”) will
additional, independent (though often still employer-funded) outside counsel be
retained for an employee. Even in cases of a separate, non-conflicted counsel
being retained for a particular employee, firms usually obtain wide access to
information relating to the representation—including, for example, information
about government questioning and answers provided by witnesses in interviews
and testimony—through the common contractual arrangement known as a
“joint defense agreement.”76
All of this is explained to employees, and they are given the option of
choosing their own lawyers from the outset and declining to join mutual
defense agreements, but few decline to participate in these arrangements. The
savings to an individual are enormous, there is worry about being perceived by
the employer as not a team player, and there are strong advantages to
consulting with a lawyer who has access to most or all of what the firm
knows—that is, documents and witness statements. These practices are
perfectly rational, in the sense that they position organizations to have access to
and control of information, and even to exert substantial influence in shaping
the facts of a case, through conduct short of obstruction of justice such as
orchestrated witness preparation.77 But the practices are not commonly seen in
“ordinary” criminal cases.
ABA Section of Litig., San Francisco, Cal.), Winter 2005, at 1; see also Daylian M. Cain et
al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (2005) (reporting results of behavioral study finding that the cognitive effect
of requiring actors to disclose can be greater licensing of wrongdoing). An illustrative case
of the confusing role of organizational counsel is described in In re Grand Jury Subpoena
(Sealed), 415 F.3d 333, 335-38 (4th Cir. 2005). While finding that the employees there did
not have an attorney-client relationship with organizational counsel, the court remarked:
[O]ur opinion should not be read as an implicit acceptance of the watered-down “Upjohn
warnings” the investigating attorneys [for the firm] gave the [employees]. It is a potential
legal and ethical mine field. Had the investigating attorneys, in fact, entered into an attorneyclient relationship with [the employees], as their statements to the appellants professed they
could, they would not have been free to waive the appellants’ privilege when a conflict arose.

Id. at 340.
75. An illustration of this scenario is recounted in Alison Frankel, Bend ’Em Like
Bennett, AM. LAW., Sept. 2006, at 17.
76. See United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1989); ABA REPORT ON
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 10-11; Lisa A. Mathewson & Catherine M. Recker,
Joint Defense Agreements in the Corporate Context: No Guarantees, CHAMPION, Sept.-Oct.
2005, at 20.
77. See Brown, supra note 64, at 10-11 (arguing that wealthy defendants can “over-
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III. PURSUIT OF INDIVIDUAL CRIME WITHIN FIRMS
I will now examine in detail two of the three procedural issues that have
produced recent controversy in the state’s pursuit of crime within firms: state
use of the fruits of employees’ waiver of the right to silence and state
involvement in firms’ indemnification of their agents for costs of legal
proceedings arising from wrongdoing within firms. (I will not discuss the
attorney-client privilege issue in detail, for reasons explained in Part IV.)
Current debate about these topics has usually jumped either to polemics or to
specific reform measures, such as the government’s recent tweaking of
provisions in its prosecution guidelines. Accordingly, as to each topic, my
objectives are primarily to develop underlying considerations of social policy
and secondarily to address the wisdom of reforms. Examination of each
problem both illustrates the structural features of pursuing wrongdoing in the
firm context that I described in Part II and provides occasion to use those same
contextual features to respond to the policy controversy at issue.
A. Statements and the Fifth Amendment
1. The Fifth Amendment
At the surface, what happens to people’s self-incrimination position when
crime is investigated in the workplace might seem troubling. Generally
speaking, employees are expected to cooperate with their employers’ and the
state’s efforts to gather facts about wrongdoing within firms, including by
answering questions. Of course, the employer (and even the state) does not
have the power to literally take away an employee’s right not to incriminate
herself. She may refuse to answer, just like the citizen who is confronted by a
police officer while walking down the street. But refusal in the workplace is
much more costly than silence on the street. If firms are to require their agents
to say what they know, some reason must be given to induce the agent to speak.

litigate” and impede enforcement, particularly in corporate cases that are expensive, timeconsuming, and include early involvement of counsel); id. at 16-17 (stating that counsel
representing multiple suspects can thwart prosecution by counteracting prisoner’s dilemma
and that these results can occur even when counsel are different but are paid by a single
organizational benefactor); Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69,
119-26 (1995) (describing how common funding of counsel can cause individual lawyers to
steer clients away from negotiating cooperation agreements with the state); Stuntz, supra
note 56, at 1945 n.102 (stating that lawyers lawfully suppress information “through
strategically framed witness interviews, cooperation with other targets of the investigation,
discovery negotiations, suppression motions, and the like”); id. at 1946 (arguing that the
“dominant” role of lawyers in white collar investigations is “to limit the government’s access
to relevant information”); id. at 1950 (stating that organizations can impede criminal
investigations by “using common defense counsel for different suspects or simply by using
organization resources to pay for a particular suspect’s lawyer”).
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The reason can only be what rests within the firm’s control: denial of the
compensation or employment that the firm confers upon the employee.
This might appear to place a person in a much worse, and perhaps
anomalous, position with regard to questioning when it occurs in the workplace
than when it occurs on the street—especially if the state’s practices increase the
likelihood and frequency with which the employer is apt to put the employee in
this position. But to see whether the employee’s situation is so much worse and
whether her difference in position calls for protective measures, principles
about self-incrimination must be considered. The case for affording
constitutional protections to the employee who is placed in this situation turns
out to be exceedingly weak.
a. Normative theories of self-incrimination
Set aside doctrine for a moment, at least as it applies to questioning in
the workplace. Should Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination
apply to private employer-employee relationships? An obvious argument on
behalf of employers and the state says no: private organizations, in order to
effectively pursue their missions, must enjoy the freedom to prohibit, detect,
investigate, and sanction legal violations and other misconduct by employees.
No system for control of the workplace could function unless the employer
could require employees to answer questions about what occurs there. Nor
could modern regulatory programs function in a remotely cost-effective manner
by relying on private compliance efforts without such employer authority.
What might be said on behalf of the employee’s interests? Answering this
question requires a normative account of the privilege against selfincrimination. Unfortunately that project has proved taxing and somewhat
unsuccessful; no theory can claim coalescence of the literature or absence of
basic gaps or flaws.78 Five theories have achieved prominence in the discussion
of the right against self-incrimination. I will discuss why none of them supplies
a justification for barring the state’s use in criminal cases of employercompelled statements.
Beginning with more established theories, the “cruel trilemma” rationale
holds that the Fifth Amendment prevents the state from forcing a person to
choose among three punishments: sanction for the charged crime imposed as a
result of admitting guilt; sanction for perjury imposed as a result of falsely (and

78. Ronald J. Allen & M. Kristin Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained and
Its Future Predicted, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 243-45 (2004); Akhil Reed Amar
& Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93
MICH. L. REV. 857, 857-58 (1995); see also John Fabian Witt, Making the Fifth: The
Constitutionalization of American Self-Incrimination Doctrine, 1791-1903, 77 TEX. L. REV.
825, 834-36 (1999) (explaining why constitutional privilege was largely irrelevant to courts’
treatment of admissibility of self-incriminating statements during the early years of the
Republic).
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provably) denying guilt; and sanction for contempt imposed as a result of
refusing to testify.79 This rationale does not explain why innocent persons
deserve and receive Fifth Amendment protection,80 or why the state can force
equally painful choices, such as whether to be punished or testify against a
friend or family member.81 It stumbles on the problem that most cases in which
the state would need to rely on a confession to secure a conviction are unlikely
to involve sufficient evidence to prove a perjury charge based on testimony
denying guilt. It does not explain why the Fifth Amendment applies to
statements given in contexts such as police interviews that do not carry
contempt penalties for refusal to answer.82 To apply in the firm context, the
theory would have to encompass protection against a “cruel quadrilemma,”
since the individual facing employer compulsion has a fourth choice: refuse to
answer and suffer employment sanctions. Under this theory, it is not clear what
makes a set of choices constitutionally “cruel”; whatever might count as cruel,
it seems doubtful that economic consequences would.
The “privacy” rationale holds that the right against self-incrimination is a
constitutional sibling of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.83 Both prohibit the state from investigating crime in a
manner that violates a person’s constitutional zone of privacy.84 Extracting a
self-incriminating statement is like removing an incriminating document from a
person’s home. This argument suffers from a fatal problem of fit. The Fifth
Amendment speaks in absolute terms and contains no “reasonableness”
modifier, as does the Fourth.85 Lots of things that might be styled as invasions
of privacy are permitted under the Fourth Amendment, including search and
seizure of a person’s home and effects under the authority of a warrant or any
of numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement.86 The state may extract

79. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
80. Allen & Mace, supra note 78, at 244; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 318 (1991).
81. See United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893, 896-900 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (Sealed), 607 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Amar & Lettow, supra note
78, at 890; William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1227,
1237-38 (1988).
82. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
83. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973); Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55. But see
United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 572 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“Nor can [the
Fifth Amendment privilege] be invoked simply to protect the witness’ interest in privacy.”).
During a brief period in the nineteenth century when courts flirted with affording the Fifth
Amendment privilege to corporations, a move long since abandoned, privacy supplied the
rationale. Witt, supra note 78, at 901-02.
84. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); Robert S. Gerstein,
Privacy and Self-Incrimination, 80 ETHICS 87 (1970).
85. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V; see also New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459
(1979) (balancing with right against self-incrimination is “impermissible”); Amar & Lettow,
supra note 78, at 872.
86. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353-57 (1967); Warrantless Searches and
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physical evidence, such as blood, from the very body of a person.87 If the Fifth
Amendment protects privacy, then the immunity device is constitutionally
insufficient and the state may no longer prove propositions before tribunals by
compelling testimony with a promise not to use such testimony to prosecute the
witness.88 A privacy argument also would be weaker in the firm context, since
persons reasonably hold less expectation of privacy in the workplace than at
home.89
The “fair play” rationale says that the Fifth Amendment, in effect, ensures
that the state cannot use the defendant (through her own words) as an
instrument to meet the state’s exclusive burden of proving criminal liability.90
This claim is overbroad. It would also prohibit the state from doing a host of
things that law has long permitted and that would seem essential to a workable
system, including using documents authored by the defendant (even private
diaries) and extracting and using the defendant’s DNA.91 “Fair play” is not a
self-executing concept. It requires a normative account, with reference to
context, of what play is fair and why. The purpose of requiring the state to
shoulder a heavy burden of proof in criminal cases is robust error avoidance in
the face of high error costs, not a prior commitment that the state carrying the
load is, in some abstract sense, “fair” or “good.”92
The “fair play” inquiry might nonetheless lead to the conclusion that selfincriminating statements are, as a class, unreliable—or at least that selfincriminating statements are unreliable when they are given in response to an
element of coercion—and therefore error avoidance recommends a rule against
their use.93 This might be a valid point, if it carries empirical support. And it
would certainly extend to the employment context. But it would lead to
radically different Fifth Amendment doctrine, for all purposes, than exists at
present. Perhaps no statements made to law enforcement officers pursuing
criminal investigations would be admissible because of the coercion inherent in

Seizures, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 37, 37-128 (2006); see also Amar & Lettow,
supra note 78, at 890-91 (explaining that the Fifth Amendment also permits the state to
require testimony about “intensely private, highly embarrassing matters”).
87. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Stuntz, supra note 81, at 1233.
88. For this practice, see 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (2007); Allen & Mace, supra note 78, at
244, 262.
89. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987).
90. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
91. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984) (holding that the Fifth Amendment
shields the act of producing business records but not their contents); Shaffer v. Saffle, 148
F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that extraction of DNA from a prisoner did not violate
the Fourth or Fifth Amendments); United States v. Doe, 1 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding
that Fifth Amendment did not shield private diary from production in response to subpoena).
92. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).
93. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55; ROGER W. SHUY, THE LANGUAGE OF CONFESSION,
INTERROGATION, AND DECEPTION 40-50 (1998) (discussing evidence of fallibility of
admissions in response to police questioning); Amar & Lettow, supra note 78, at 900-01.
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such settings. Indeed, plea bargaining would seem to be ruled out, since all
admissions of guilt made in exchange for leniency involve pressure.94
Because these lines of argument have not fared well, more creative
approaches have emerged. William Stuntz has argued that the Fifth
Amendment privilege operates as if it were an excuse defense to the crime of
perjury.95 People commonly lie in order to preserve their liberty. Such lying is
not only inalterable human nature but also morally unproblematic because it
represents a choice of the lesser of two evils. Instead of forcing a person to
choose the lesser evil, and then having to decide whether to excuse that
person’s perjury, the law affords an ex ante right to refuse to speak. The
prophylactic, constitutional approach is more graceful and avoids unnecessary
harm to innocent persons that would result from injecting a large quantity of
guilty persons’ false denials into the adjudication process.
Stuntz’s argument is appealing, even if it is (as Stuntz explains)
implausible as an account of constitutional purpose.96 But it does little to
explain what the Fifth Amendment might have to say about employercompelled statements. In the workplace, the lesser evil is not perjury, but
silence followed by job loss. An excuse theory of the Fifth Amendment would
justify protections in the context of current practice within firms only if the
Fifth Amendment were understood to guarantee employment.97 Such an
understanding of self-incrimination protections seems particularly implausible
in the context of at-will employment.
In a similar vein with different methodology, Daniel Seidmann and Alex
Stein recently posited that the Fifth Amendment privilege has a strong
instrumental justification.98 The right to silence gives the guilty suspect facing
interrogation a rational option other than lying. In the absence of the right, most
guilty suspects would lie, increasing the quantity of false statements
confronting legal actors (investigators, enforcers, judges, jurors, etc.). More
false statements would worsen the position of innocent suspects attempting to
convince factfinders of their truthful claims of innocence, because the
innocents would find themselves “pooled” with guilties in more of a “lemons”
market than would inhere if most guilty suspects remained silent.99
94. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; Stuntz, supra note 81, at 1270-72.
95. Stuntz, supra note 81, at 1228-29.
96. Id. at 1231 & n.7.
97. An additional complication for Stuntz’s theory, in positive terms, is that it does not
account for why one might want to afford a right to refuse to submit to a polygraph
examination even if the exam were infallible, or why the law does not afford a right to refuse
to produce subpoenaed documents or provide handwriting exemplars even though such acts
can involve fabrication and alteration. Allen & Mace, supra note 78, at 265-66.
98. Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A
Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430, 458-61
(2000); see also Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 (“[T]he privilege, while sometimes a shelter to the
guilty, is often a protection to the innocent.” (internal quotations omitted)).
99. Seidmann & Stein, supra note 98, at 458-61.
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Seidmann and Stein have expanded on a very interesting theoretical insight
that has serious empirical vulnerabilities. One has to believe that factfinders
believe guilty suspects make heaviest use of the privilege, or in other words
that factfinders disregard the dictates of the same Fifth Amendment that
Seidmann and Stein are justifying, which prohibits this inference. But first, one
has to believe that factfinders think about suspect statements in a market sense
at all, that is, that they consider the overall tendency of suspects to behave one
way or another rather than simply the behavior of the suspect they confront.
One also has to believe that rational innocent suspects, or at least most of them,
do not seek the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege, even though the
most informed rational actors in the criminal justice system—the defense
lawyers—counsel virtually every client, at least initially, to invoke the right
regardless of the client’s guilt or the facts of the case.100
In the firm context, Seidmann and Stein’s theory becomes harder to
support. One would also have to believe that the employer’s threat of job
termination for refusal to answer questions places the rational guilty suspect in
the same position as the rational guilty suspect in a hypothetical world in which
silence were not an option. But guilty suspects in firm cases, facing employer
threats of job loss for refusal to answer, might rationally choose to lose their
jobs rather than lie. Which suspects make that choice would depend on
individual calculations about the strength of the state’s case as (and if) it
develops over time. This is hard to model. In any event, if the principal motive
is to maximize the factfinder’s access to accurate information, affording
employees the ability to refuse to answer questions in organizational inquiries
would plainly leave the factfinder worse off than in a world in which many (but
not all) employees gave statements, even if some “lemons” discount had to be
applied to that pool of statements.101 It is hard to imagine a single investigation
of wrongdoing committed in a firm progressing past square one under a regime
that told employees: “You may refuse to answer questions in any internal
inquiry and no penalty will follow.”102
100. See Richard Lempert, The Economic Analysis of Evidence Law: Common Sense
on Stilts, 87 VA. L. REV. 1619, 1693 (2001) (explaining how innocent defendants can have
good reasons to decline to testify).
101. See T.H. Waters III, Note, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: An Examination of
a “Costly” Right to Silence for Corporate Employees in Criminal Investigations, 25 REV.
LITIG. 603, 624-31 (2006).
102. The problems of Fifth Amendment theory are so substantial that some theorists
have largely abandoned the normative field and have sought to offer positive accounts of
existing precedent that aspire only to bring rationality and predictability to the cases. See
Allen & Mace, supra note 78, at 245-46; Amar & Lettow, supra note 78, at 857-60. At least
one of those descriptions would jettison even the line of cases that affords some Fifth
Amendment protection to employees in the context of public employment (the “Garrity”
doctrine, which I will discuss shortly) as an erroneous departure from constitutional doctrine.
Amar & Lettow, supra note 78, at 868, 905-06. But see Steven D. Clymer, Compelled
Statements from Police Officers and Garrity Immunity, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1362-65
(2001) (urging alteration rather than abandonment of the Garrity doctrine).
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b. Positive Fifth Amendment law
A case for constitutional measures to address the employee’s situation
fares just as poorly in terms of existing Fifth Amendment doctrine. The Fifth
Amendment privilege principally protects a person from the use of compelled
statements against the person in a criminal action.103 It does not bar the use of
statements in non-criminal actions.104 Arguably, it does not prohibit state
compulsion of statements per se.105 The Fifth Amendment does not prevent the
admission of privately compelled statements in criminal proceedings.106 And
legal entities enjoy no Fifth Amendment privilege.107 The Constitution would
thus appear to have little to say about employer-compelled statements in
investigations within firms.
Whether the state can make use of the fruits of such an employer process is
another question. The courts have considered this question in the line of cases
beginning with Garrity v. New Jersey, which hold that the state may not use a
statement extracted from an employee, upon threat of termination for refusal to
answer, against that employee in a criminal prosecution.108 Of course, the
103. See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430 (1956); Smith v. United States,
337 U.S. 137, 147 (1949); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 548 (1897).
104. See United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364
(1986); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
105. Amar & Lettow, supra note 78, at 875 n.64; Kate E. Bloch, Fifth Amendment
Compelled Statements: Modeling the Contours of Their Protected Scope, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
1603, 1685-86 (1994); Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda?, 112
YALE L.J. 447, 450 (2002) (arguing that the privilege is an exclusionary rule). This last point
has been debated, as a matter of both positive reading of precedent and normative theory; the
question also requires consideration of how the Due Process Clause restrains more extreme
state interrogation measures. Susan R. Klein, No Time for Silence, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1337
(2003) (arguing that the Fifth Amendment regulates police conduct, not just admission of
wrongly procured evidence); Peter Westen, Self-Incrimination’s Covert Federalism,
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2007) (examining the question of whether privilege is a
“self-executing exclusionary rule”). However, this discussion leads to the question of
whether an individual may recover damages for suffering an illegal interrogation. Klein,
supra, at 1349-50. I am interested only in the question of how statements may be used in
criminal proceedings. Even if it is accurate to describe the Fifth Amendment as barring
certain forms of interrogation, it seems unlikely that such a bar would extend to employercompelled statements that otherwise involve no physical or extraordinary psychological
coercion.
106. See United States v. Grimes, 142 F.3d 1342, 1349-50 (11th Cir. 1998); Smith v.
Detroit Entm’t L.L.C., 338 F. Supp. 2d 775, 780-81 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
107. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
(1906).
108. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414
U.S. 70 (1973); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); see also Uniformed Sanitation
Men Ass’n, Inc. v. Comm’r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968) (finding it unconstitutional to
dismiss sanitation workers for refusing to answer questions in grand jury); Gardner v.
Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968) (holding the same as to dismissal of police officer for
refusing to answer questions in grand jury); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (holding
the same as to revocation of a lawyer’s license on the ground that he refused to answer
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Garrity doctrine is limited to public employees.109 The doctrine has not been
extended even to statements extracted by private employers, licensors, and the
like whose activities are routinely intertwined with state action, including the
investigation and sanctioning of violations of the law. (The most common
example is statements taken by self-regulatory organizations in the financial
markets, such as the NASD and NYSE.)110
One court has advanced a theory for clearing the state action obstacle. In
United States v. Stein, Judge Lewis Kaplan of the Southern District of New
York held that when an employer requires its employees to give statements as
part of an effort to qualify for benefits in negotiating with the state over
enterprise liability, and where the state pursues an express policy of considering
employers’ positions on employee statements as a factor in exercising its
charging and settlement discretion, those employees’ statements cannot be used
in any criminal prosecution.111 Judge Kaplan’s theory presents slippery-slope
problems and invites manipulation. The theory requires a means of determining
(1) the degree of state involvement that renders the employer’s conduct state
action, and (2) the degree of employer action that renders that action
compulsion. These are hard lines to draw and to control once drawn.112
Consider a series of five cases on the dimension of state action. In Case 1,
an organization pursues its own preexisting and consistently applied policy of
requiring employees to answer questions in regulatory inquiries, on penalty of
questions in a bar disciplinary proceeding). But see Sanitation Men, 392 U.S. at 284
(observing that there would have been no right to remain silent had the inquisition been
confined to “questions specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of
their official duties”).
109. See Luna v. Massachusetts, 354 F.3d 108, 111-12 (1st Cir. 2004).
110. See, e.g., D.L. Cromwell Invs., Inc. v. NASD Regulation, Inc., 279 F.3d 155 (2d
Cir. 2002) (holding that an investigative arm of NASD that included a unit that existed for
the purpose of facilitating state action, the “Criminal Prosecution Assistance Unit,” was not a
state actor for purposes of the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863
(2d Cir. 1975) (holding that NYSE is not a state actor for purposes of the Fifth Amendment
even though it regulates securities markets in tandem with the SEC); United States v.
Antonelli, 434 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that a private security guard was not a state
actor when conducting interrogation, the fruits of which were later used by police).
111. United States v. Stein (Stein II), 440 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Judge
Kaplan attempted to limit his rule by suppressing statements from only those defendants who
first refused to be interviewed but then gave statements after they were explicitly told by the
employer that non-cooperation would lead to termination. Id. at 330-33.
112. On the state action question, the line-drawing problem plainly is not addressed by
Judge Kaplan’s reliance on a case in which the Second Circuit found state action where an
employer, at police request, wore a concealed transmitting device while administering a
polygraph examination to an employee who was a murder suspect. Id. at 334-36; see United
States ex rel. Sanney v. Montanye, 500 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1974). The Second Circuit decision
that is apposite is D.L. Cromwell, 279 F.3d 155, in which the court affirmed Judge Kaplan’s
ruling below that there was no state action in the collection of incriminating evidence by a
separate unit of a self-regulatory organization specially constituted to assist “federal and
state authorities in their investigations of securities matters.” Id. at 157, 161 (“[E]ven
heavily-regulated private entities generally are held not to be state actors.”).
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employment sanction. In Case 2, the state expresses a general view that
organizations that do not have such policies are, all else equal, less serious
about regulatory compliance than organizations that do. In Case 3, an employee
refuses to answer regulators’ questions in a particular inquiry and the regulator
informs the employer of that fact so the employer can know both that its
employee is violating its policy and that the state has information suggesting
that the employer’s policy may be ineffective or insincere. In Case 4,
employees refuse to answer questions from the regulator in a particular inquiry;
the regulator then informs the employer that its charging and settlement
discretion may be affected by a conclusion that the employer either does not
have a compliance-friendly policy or does not follow its purported policy. In
Case 5, the regulator adds to its communication in Case 4 that its discretion will
be affected by whether the employer fires the employees who refused to answer
questions.
Cases 1 and 2 are desirable if, as seems indisputable, preventing and
deterring violations in the organizational context necessitates firms having
procedures for policing their agents’ conduct. Neither case can plausibly be
described as involving the state in compulsion of any particular statement. Case
3 is simply a necessary feature of the state pursuing the position in Case 2. Case
4 might seem to present the breakpoint for purposes of state action but Case 4,
just like Case 3, could as easily be described as a necessary step to the state
pursuing the position in Case 2. For the state to encourage organizations to take
a cooperative posture toward compliance, the state must make that position
meaningful by enforcing it through some aspect of legal action. Case 5
intuitively seems over the line and undesirable, but arguably the state
accomplishes the same result as in Case 5 simply by stopping its action at the
level of Case 4.113 Further complicating the state action problem, if Case 4
were made the breakpoint at which employee statements carry a suppression
remedy, employers and employees could guarantee suppression of employee
statements simply by refusing to heed the state’s hortatory statements and
forcing the state to put teeth in its position.114
Similar problems for extending Garrity attend the matter of employer
compulsion. What does the employer have to do, or threaten to do, to the
employee to make the employee’s statement compelled?115 A rule turning on
113. For examples resembling Case 5, see John Carreyrou & Barbara Martinez, Board
Members at Bristol-Myers Told to Fire CEO, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2006, at A1; Monica
Langley & Ian McDonald, Marsh Directors Consider Having CEO Step Aside, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 22, 2004, at A1.
114. See Solomon, 509 F.2d at 869 (finding no principled basis on which to confine the
state action doctrine if applied to self-regulatory inquiries by stock exchanges since that “is
but one of many instances where government relies on self-policing by private organizations
to effectuate the purposes underlying federal regulating statutes”).
115. See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977) (stating the test for
compulsion to be “whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the free will of the
witness was overborne”); see also Allen & Mace, supra note 78, at 250-52 (explaining that if
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economic detriment, aside from being a severe departure from existing Garrity
doctrine, would be unmanageable. An employee would be able to manipulate
virtually any interaction with the employer over a questioning issue into a case
of suppression, by forcing the employer to threaten some consequence to the
employee. Such a rule would be overbroad in relation to the interests that might
justify extending Garrity. And it would lead to spillover problems in other
areas of Fifth Amendment doctrine turning on compulsion.
One might choose the threat of job termination as the necessary and
sufficient condition for compulsion.116 This would supply a bright line but it is
difficult to distinguish this act by the employer from other severe penalties that
can be imposed without offending settled Fifth Amendment law.117 For
example, the sometimes high reputational penalty (especially for a prominent
executive) that might follow public assertion of the Fifth Amendment right
does not render any statement made in the shadow of that penalty compelled.118
The state uses much more severe pressure than possible job loss to induce
waiver of the right, particularly by offering to forego additional imprisonment
in plea bargaining.119 So it is not self-evident that the threat to fire should be a
trigger for raising self-incrimination hackles. Yet there is no greater employerimposed sanction, and settling on a lower trigger-point (reduction in pay?
suspension?) would mire courts in line-drawing problems.
There is a bigger and truly decisive problem with extending Garrity to
private employers than grappling with state action or compulsion. The problem
involves the consequences of a finding that an employer-induced statement is
compelled.120 Arguably, if the individual’s statement has been taken in
free will does exist, then either all choices are products of free will or there is no method for
determining when free will is “overborne”; further explaining that, in reality, the compulsion
test is objective and turns on government action, although the location of the threshold
remains in question and is developed in a common law manner along a continuum). But see
Stein II, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 328-29 (contending that compulsion is measured both objectively
and subjectively, based on whether individual actually and reasonably believed she had no
choice but to speak).
116. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497 (1967) (“The option to lose [one’s]
means of livelihood or to pay the penalty of self-incrimination is the antithesis of free choice
to speak out or to remain silent.”). Still, even the line provided by job termination might not
turn out to be all that bright. See Sanney, 500 F.2d at 415 (finding no compulsion, even if
there had been state action, because the discharge of a “transient manual laborer” from his
job “as a driver’s assistant, which [he] had held for one or two days, can hardly be labelled
[sic] a ‘substantial economic sanction’” equivalent to ending the police careers of the Garrity
officers).
117. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 83 (1973) (“We fail to see a difference of
constitutional magnitude between the threat of job loss to an employee of the State, and a
threat of loss of contracts to a contractor.”).
118. See Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 147 (1949); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43, 66-67 (1906).
119. Allen & Mace, supra note 78, at 252.
120. Amar & Lettow, supra note 78, at 858 (“The key question, though rarely
recognized as such, is what sort of immunity the [self-incrimination] clause requires before a
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violation of her right against self-incrimination, the remedy must return her to
the position she would have occupied had she enjoyed and exercised the right.
The settled understanding is that this means the law must prohibit, in any
criminal proceeding, both the introduction of her statement as state’s evidence
at her trial (“use immunity”) and the introduction at her trial of any evidence
the state obtained as a result of anything she said in her statement (“derivative
use immunity”).121 The Garrity cases have implied that use plus derivative use
immunity (so-called “Kastigar immunity”) is the required remedy in the
Garrity context.122 What has been called “Garrity immunity” probably means
suppression of both the statement and its fruits. After all, the well-established
regime of compulsion under an immunity grant is premised on tolerating the
denial of the Fifth Amendment privilege only because the immunity grant
protects a person as fully as the privilege.123
The appearance of Kastigar in the firm context would abundantly
complicate matters. By consensus of the federal courts, derivative use
immunity must include at least a prohibition on evidentiary use of fruits of the
statement (e.g., admission of a document discovered through something
revealed orally in an interrogation); some courts have held that nonevidentiary
use of fruits (e.g., a prosecutor’s decision to change the guiding theory of an
investigation or case in response to something revealed orally in an
interrogation) is also prohibited.124 Some authority prohibits even the “indirect
evidentiary use” of fruits, a rule that famously upset the conviction of Oliver
North on the ground that grand jury witnesses who had been exposed to his
immunized congressional testimony allowed that testimony to refresh their
recollections.125 All of these protections designed to preserve the Fifth
Amendment right are enforced with the procedural rule that the state, facing a

person may be made to tell all outside his own ‘criminal case,’ beyond the earshot of the
petit jury.”).
121. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
122. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 809 (1977); Turley, 414 U.S. at 84;
United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233, 1240 n.7 (11th Cir. 1998); Kinamon v. United States,
45 F.3d 343, 347 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1431 n.11 (9th Cir.
1994); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 40 F.3d 1096, 1100-02 (10th Cir. 1994); Clymer, supra
note 102, at 1317-18, 1327-28. But see Bloch, supra note 105, at 1631-32, 1692-93 (arguing
that the Garrity cases have left open the question of whether Kastigar-type protections apply
to such statements).
123. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 457, 462 (stating that immunity puts the witness “in
substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege in the absence of a
state grant of immunity” (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964))).
124. See United States v. Semkiw, 712 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v.
McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973). But see United States v. Bolton, 977 F.2d 1196 (7th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1985). See generally Witt, supra
note 78, at 881-87 (describing the development of testimonial (in place of transactional)
immunity statutes as coinciding with the rejection of old common law evidentiary rules
against admission of party statements).
125. United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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Kastigar challenge to a prosecution, exclusively bears the “heavy” burden of
disproving taint.126 This burden can be met only by demonstrating that each
piece of evidence that will be used to prove the case was derived from an
independent source.127
“Kastigar immunity” can amount to transactional immunity, even if the
state has a high degree of control over the evidence.128 Tamper-proof
procedures that seal off evidence may be necessary to allow a later prosecution
of the immunized person.129 The problem grows exponentially when actors
other than the state control the gathering and use of evidence, even when those
actors’ interests are partially aligned with those of prosecutors, such as
Congress or (the most common Garrity actor) police disciplinary authorities.130
These problems would be at their apex in criminal cases within firms because
(1) civil regulatory agencies, beyond the control and knowledge of criminal
authorities, often investigate and take statements in a matter before it
progresses to the criminal stage;131 and (2) a firm and its employees would
have the ability and the motive to confer “Garrity immunity” and cause that
immunity to permeate the state’s enforcement efforts by disseminating
immunized statements. The latter scenario is precisely what is meant by the
idea of an “immunity bath.”132
The Fifth Amendment, perhaps surprisingly, thus turns out to be an
unprofitable source in understanding and responding to current controversy
126. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460-61; see also United States v. Nanni, 59 F.3d 1425, 1432
(2d Cir. 1995) (“In determining whether the immunized testimony could have influenced the
government’s decision to pursue its line of investigation, if it appears that that pursuit could
have been motivated by both tainted and independent factors, the court must determine
whether the government would have taken the same steps ‘entirely apart from the motivating
effect of the immunized testimony.’” (quoting United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 689
(2d Cir. 1990))).
127. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460-61.
128. Amar & Lettow, supra note 78, at 878-79; Clymer, supra note 102, at 1324-27.
129. See United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also
United States v. Hsia, 131 F. Supp. 2d 195, 201 (D.D.C. 2001) (“[U]nless every ‘i’ is dotted
and every ‘t’ is crossed, the government has an almost insurmountable burden to
demonstrate that the use of immunized testimony, no matter how indirect, has not been
tainted by knowledge of [its immunized content].”).
130. Bloch, supra note 105, at 1666-67; Clymer, supra note 102, at 1312-13, 1328-36;
see also United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 870 (2d Cir. 1975) (claiming that it “would
clearly be intolerable” to extend Garrity to give self-regulatory entities such as stock
exchanges the power to grant immunity).
131. See Garrett, supra note 45 (manuscript at 29 tbl.1) (finding that 60% of recent
deferred prosecution agreements in criminal matters involving firms were reached in
conjunction with civil regulatory inquiries).
132. See Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 433 (1959) (Clark, J., dissenting);
United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 1976). Judge Kaplan’s opinion in
Stein II was silent on remedy beyond suppression of the employee statements from direct use
in the government’s case. United States v. Stein (Stein II), 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 338
(S.D.N.Y. 2006). If they have not already done so, the Stein defendants should probably
move to dismiss the entire case on ground of taint.

1646

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:1613

over the treatment of employee statements in the state’s investigation of crime
within firms. A more promising approach than attempting to transpose law and
theory developed in other contexts is to consider the relevance of the structural
characteristics described in Part II that distinguish the investigation of crime
within the firm from “ordinary” crime.
2. The firm context and prescriptions
The firm can facilitate or encourage violations of the law and can present
special barriers to the detection and proof of crime. But the state can exploit the
same organizational form to overcome those barriers, by leveraging the
organization to increase the availability of witness statements.133 Witness
statements are essential to the development of facts about wrongdoing that
occurs within team production. Certainly the law would not want to enhance
firms’ ability to complicate the discovery of facts by giving firms the power to
immunize their own agents. And persons who may be involved in, or simply
witnesses to, wrongdoing that occurs within firms should not be advantaged
over ordinary persons in having a special ability to confer immunity upon
themselves.
But the state’s need for statements is particular in the firm context. This
setting is far from the police interrogation room. Few if any cases of white
collar violations in large organizations are proven at trial by introducing
confessions. The state proves such cases with documents and testimony by
knowledgeable insiders. The state needs a witness statement not so much to
prove a case against that witness as to develop that witness into a witness
against someone else, or to develop a sufficient understanding of what
happened within the firm to locate and understand documentary and other
proof. In terms of their use against the defendant, a defendant’s prior statements
are likely to be important, at most, on cross-examination if the defendant
chooses to testify, a circumstance in which ordinary Fifth Amendment
suppression does not apply.134
The slow ripening of the organizational criminal case means that
individuals are often forced to calculate their risks early in an investigation with
limited or no information about potential outcomes. Early in the process, any
given employee is unlikely to be able to predict whether she will end up, to use
the vernacular, as a target (likely to be charged), a subject (implicated in
wrongdoing), or a witness (with knowledge but not implicated). Adding
employment consequences including possible job loss to the risk calculus
heightens a person’s self-incrimination dilemma.
133. See United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 870 (2d Cir. 1975) (“[T]here would
be a complete breakdown in the regulation of many areas of business if employers did not
carry most of the load of keeping their employees in line and have the sanction of discharge
for refusal to answer what is essential to that end.”).
134. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
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But there is still more to the picture of the individual’s position. The role of
lawyers in firm cases cuts in two directions with regard to self-incrimination.
Early involvement of usually able counsel means that the employee may have
greater access to better legal advice than the ordinary citizen in making the selfincrimination decision. But that legal advice may be conflicted due to economic
incentives, as well as pressures toward group conformity. Particularly early in
an investigation, the firm has a strong interest in communicating internally and
externally that no wrongdoing has occurred and that it and its employees have
nothing to hide. Counsel for the firm, and even individual counsel retained by
the firm, therefore face some pressure, not applicable to counsel outside the
firm context, to encourage clients to speak (or at least not to advise them with
the usual vigor to remain silent).
Perhaps not by accident, procedures have developed in the investigation of
crime within firms that appear to reflect, at least in part, this balance of
interests. Prosecutors routinely offer employees “proffer” protection in
investigative interviews with the state. Proffer protection consists of a contract
in which the state promises limited use immunity, between no protection and
immunity coextensive with full Fifth Amendment protections (Kastigar
immunity). Usually the protection consists of a promise not to use the
individual’s statements as evidence in the state’s case-in-chief, with reservation
of the right to use the statements as leads to other evidence and as evidence (in
cross-examination, for example) to rebut defense evidence that contradicts the
statements.135 Employers have no power to offer proffer protections that would
bind the state, of course; not all prosecutors offer the protection to all interview
subjects; and many subjects refuse the protection, especially early in
investigations, for fear that asking for it will make the subject appear
(especially to the employer) to be someone who at least knows of wrongdoing
and possibly also fears liability.
The proffer practice offers a partial response to controversy over the state
providing employers with incentives to induce employees to make statements.
The balance of interests with regard to the problem of self-incrimination within
the firm might lead to the following prescriptions: employers should be
permitted to require employees to answer questions in regulatory inquiries; the
state should be free to consider in its charging and settlement decisions whether
firms have effective policies designed to further regulatory compliance; the
state should not be free to dictate to employers any particular sanction for any
particular employee; and employees should not bear unnecessary and
exceptional burdens on their ability to calculate the risks of self-incrimination.
If so, a regime that provided employee statements with use but not derivative
135. See, e.g., United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995); United States v.
Barrow, 400 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Velez, 354 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2004);
Stein II, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 321-22 & n.20 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Richard B. Zabel &
James J. Benjamin, Jr., “Queen for a Day” or “Courtesan for a Day”: The Sixth Amendment
Limits to Proffer Agreements, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME REP., Oct. 2001, at 1.
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use protection would accommodate much of both the state’s and the
individual’s legitimate interests.136
This regime could be made more law-like than present proffer practice in
one of three ways. Courts could extend Garrity to the private employer but
change its remedy by holding that Garrity immunity consists solely of direct
use immunity, not full Kastigar immunity. This would be a rather brute and
possibly untenable judicial maneuver, especially given state action doctrine.
Alternatively, Congress could legislate the same degree of protection for
employee statements. But this requires Congress to do something awkward,
unusual, and probably impossible to enforce, that is, tell the executive branch
that it may not consider something in the exercise of its discretion.137 To give
use immunity to employee statements, Congress would have to say a statement
receives use immunity when it is made in response to state questioning
following (1) the state communicating to the employer that the employer’s
policy on employee cooperation may be a factor in charging and settlement and
(2) the employer then requiring the employee to answer the state’s questions or
face employment consequences. The bill that Senator Specter recently
introduced, which would inadvisably prevent the state from considering
anything having to do with employer policies on regulatory interviews,
glaringly suffers from this problem.138 The bill not only fails to recognize the
appropriate balance of interests in its effort to ban the state from encouraging
employers to require their employees to share information, but is also silent on
how a court could possibly enforce a prohibition on “thinking x when

136. This also matches the prescription that one analysis of the Fifth Amendment has
provided for constitutional doctrine as whole: the Supreme Court should abandon Kastigar’s
prohibition on the use of the fruits derived from compelled pretrial statements. Amar &
Lettow, supra note 78, at 858, 911; see also Bloch, supra note 105, at 1605 (noting the
illogic that the existing doctrine affords more protection to fruits of statements taken in
formal, court-supervised immunity process than to statements extracted from uncounseled
suspects in back rooms of police stations); Clymer, supra note 102, at 1313 (similarly noting
a disparity that “borders on absurd” between the doctrine’s treatment of Garrity-type
statements and confessions extracted by police interrogation); Witt, supra note 78, at 916-18
(questioning limited protections for fruits of illegal interrogations). I concede that the
effectiveness of this approach would depend on all active jurisdictions pursuing it in
coordinated fashion, since nothing requires one jurisdiction to abide by another’s proffer
promises.
137. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988) (rejecting the claim that the
independent counsel statute was unconstitutional in part on the ground that “with the
exception of the power of impeachment—which applies to all officers of the United States—
Congress retained for itself no powers of control or supervision over an independent
counsel”). An exception, of course, would be unconstitutionally discriminatory enforcement.
See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (noting that the prosecutor is
constitutionally prohibited from selecting a defendant for prosecution on the basis of the
defendant’s race).
138. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007).
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exercising discretion,” and what the remedy would be for a violation, even if it
were detectable.139
A more promising avenue for reform would be for executive branch
agencies to alter their policies to require prosecutors and other regulators to
afford contractual proffer protection whenever requested by employees who
give statements in organizational investigations under employer policies
requiring employee cooperation. No such provision was included, or apparently
considered, in the DOJ’s new policy guidelines for prosecutors in
organizational cases.
Such reform measures would still leave unregulated employee statements
to employer representatives in internal inquiries, which are often shared with
the state. But the executive branch could also adopt a policy of not using such
statements as direct evidence against employees. Such a policy would make
sense in light of the principal use of such statements by the state as leads and
investigative tools rather than trial evidence. Admittedly, this move would not
address what happens when the state proceeds as far as subpoenaing an
employee to testify, but that context encompasses a substantial minority of the
questioning that occurs in corporate investigations.140
139. The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.
1973), may be informative. The court ordered an executive branch agency, the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare, to enforce a federal statute (Title VI) only because the
statute included specific enforcement procedures, because the agency’s failure was
comprehensive nonenforcement rather than case-specific declination, and because the
agency was funding the same institutions that were in violation of the regulatory regime it
refused to enforce. Id. at 1162; see also 42 U.S.C. § 3612(o) (2007) (requiring the DOJ to
file suit under the Fair Housing Act if certain requirements are met). The Adams court was
careful to distinguish rulings in which the court refused to intervene in the exercise of the
executive branch’s enforcement discretion in criminal prosecutions. Adams, 480 F.2d at
1162. Finally, Adams is understood as an exceptional case. Salvador v. Bennett, 800 F.2d 97,
99-100 (7th Cir. 1986).
140. A related complication is whether employees should face legal sanctions for false
statements in interviews conducted by employers. See, e.g., Indictment, United States v.
Singleton, No. 4:06CR080 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2006) (on file with author) (charging the
defendant with obstruction of justice for lying to employer’s outside counsel in the internal
investigation of potential regulatory violations). In the run-of-the-mill case, this cause of
action seems normatively unattractive and might face a serious hurdle under existing
interpretations of the obstruction of justice statutes that require a close “nexus” between any
falsehood and the legal proceeding the falsehood is intended to obstruct. United States v.
Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 598-601 (1995). A different case might be an instance in which a
corporate manager intentionally supplied outside counsel with an elaborate and falsely
exculpatory account of a transaction, with the expectation and hope that counsel would
provide that account to the state, causing the state to abandon its inquiry. See Timothy P.
Harkness & Darren LaVerne, Private Lies May Lead to Prosecution, NAT’L L.J., July 24,
2006, at S1 (describing the government’s pursuit of this theory in case in which the former
CEO of Computer Associates provided outside counsel with a false explanation in an
accounting fraud investigation that the CEO expected counsel to provide to the government).
Such conduct is akin to a person causing an agent such as a lawyer to provide a false
document to a tribunal. E.g., United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1223 (2d
Cir. 1983).
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B. Selection and Funding of Counsel
I will now address a second problem of law and policy: the state’s
involvement in firms’ indemnification of agents for legal expenses. Again, I
will begin with existing law and then move to consideration of how the
structural characteristics of crime within firms can assist analysis of reform.
1. The Sixth Amendment and indemnification
Some constitutional ground clearing is necessary. The Sixth Amendment
generally assures a person her counsel of choice, although even that core
guarantee is not absolute.141 The legal system may override an individual’s
selection of counsel when that choice would seriously compromise accuracy
and legitimacy of legal process.142 (Thus, constitutional law might actually
restrict a firm’s freedom to fund an agent’s defense, rather than guarding such
funding from state intrusion.)
The Sixth Amendment also guarantees that counsel be effective, and
requires the state to provide sufficient funding to ensure such performance.143
Of course, the funding guarantee is infamously set virtually below ground.144
The Sixth Amendment promises no particular quantity of resources; the
question is simply whether some counsel has been provided and whether that
counsel was able to perform “effectively” under a standard of ex post review
that excuses all manner of deficient lawyering.145 The importance or
complexity of a case certainly drives up defense costs,146 but it does not have
much impact on what the Constitution guarantees. A thousand dollars may be
constitutionally sufficient to fund a defense in a case in which the state seeks to

141. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
142. Id. at 162; see also United States v. Purnett, 910 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1990)
(noting that the right to proceed pro se is not absolute).
143. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-91 (1984) (explaining the contours
of the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel); United States v. Parker, 439 F.3d 81, 90
(2d Cir. 2006) (stating that public funding for indigent defendants ensures that the
constitutional mandate of effective assistance of counsel is satisfied).
144. Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1.
145. Id.; see also Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159 (“[A] defendant may not insist on
representation by an attorney he cannot afford.”).
146. JOSEPH WARREN BISHOP, JR., THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS:
INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE § 6:30 (Supp. 2006) (“The sort of litigation in which
corporate executives are involved . . . is likely to be protracted, complex, and expensive. If
the executive must pay lawyers out of his or her own pocket, until it can be determined
whether his or her conduct was up to the statutory standard and within the context of official
corporate capacity, the executive may find it hard to raise the cash to pay the kind of lawyers
that are needed.” (footnotes omitted)).
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execute a person.147 And the Sixth Amendment right does not attach at all until
the initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings.
The effective assistance doctrine thus turns out to be mostly inapplicable to
the setting of the organizational criminal case. One cannot mount a
constitutional argument for a guarantee of access to private funding for
criminal defense in business firms without entirely reworking the Sixth
Amendment right to grant far more public resources to the indigent defendant.
Such a move may not be feasible due to political constraints on the use of
government resources and concerns about creating rules that could seriously
disrupt the criminal process by leading to frequent reversal of convictions.
The reverse side of the counsel coin is that the Constitution generally
places no restraint on a person’s ability to spend resources on a criminal
defense.148 The effect of this is to create sliding-scale justice (actually, slidingscale law) under which, all else equal, the wealthy face a lower expected
sanction than the poor. But restricting how one spends one’s wealth, much less
how one spends it on one’s freedom, is seen as un-American. This is not to say
that the state has no ability to intrude upon private funding of a defense. A
criminal defendant enjoys no right to use the fruits of her crime to fund an
effort to defeat sanctioning for that crime.149 Even this limitation, however, has
provoked serious objection.150
The controversy in the firm criminal case is not the question of whether a
firm’s agent may spend her own funds on her defense, but rather the question
of whether the firm’s funds may be deployed for the agent’s defense. This issue
is, for the most part, a component of the general subject of indemnification of
agents by their principals. As such, the issue implicates policy choices and
contractual bargaining rather than constitutional law. The issue also represents
a fairly narrow slice of the indemnification subject. The concern is not
indemnification for sanctions. At least in a criminal case, most would agree that
indemnifying an agent for monetary penalties for a criminal act is
undesirable.151 And, of course, one generally cannot be indemnified against a
147. See Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of
Legal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L.
783, 818-19.
148. United States v. Farmer, 274 F.3d 800, 802 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that the Sixth
Amendment extends to an individual’s right to spend his “legitimate, nonforfeitable assets”
on his own defense).
149. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989); United
States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
150. See, e.g., Todd Barnet & Ivan Fox, Trampling on the Sixth Amendment: The
Continued Threat of Attorney Fee Forfeiture, 22 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1 (1995).
151. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 533.5(a) (2007) (“No policy of insurance shall
provide, or be construed to provide, any coverage or indemnity for the payment of any fine,
penalty, or restitution in any criminal action or proceeding . . . .”). While Delaware law
allows a corporation to indemnify an officer in some circumstances for criminal fines, DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2007), an ex post decision to indemnify is permitted only if the
officer “acted in good faith.” Id. A Delaware corporation may contract ex ante to supply

1652

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:1613

sanction of imprisonment, at least not one of substantial length.152 The issue
here is simply indemnification for legal costs associated with resisting the
state’s effort to impose a sanction.
The present legal regime governing this subject consists principally of state
law and federal executive branch policy. Under the dominant Delaware regime,
a corporation must indemnify, for all costs, a director or officer who prevails in
litigation on the merits.153 Corporations may, and almost always do, cover this
obligation by purchasing director and officer liability insurance.154 A
corporation may indemnify an agent for costs if the agent acted in “good faith,”
“reasonably believed” her actions to be in or not opposed to the interests of the
firm, and—if the action is criminal—had “no reasonable cause” to believe her
actions were “unlawful.”155 A corporation may also advance litigation
expenses to a director or officer provided that the director or officer promises to
repay such funds if she is not successful on the merits.156 To engage in any
such act of permissive indemnification ex post, a corporation must obtain the
approval of its shareholders or the majority of its “disinterested” directors or act
in reliance on a legal opinion of an independent attorney.157 However, a
corporation enjoys the freedom to contract ex ante to provide any other
indemnification and advancement rights to its agents.158
additional indemnification rights in criminal cases. Id. § 145(f). Whether it is a good idea to
allow indemnification for criminal sanctions is debatable. There may also be market
constraints on managers’ ability to persuade corporations to agree ex ante to indemnify for
intentional criminal violations.
152. Kraakman, supra note 41, at 876; see also LoPucki, supra note 30, at 85
(suggesting that incarceration would be needed to control wrongdoing in world of judgmentproof actors). But see Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409, 410 (1980) (arguing that given sufficient penalties and offender
assets, fines can fully substitute for imprisonment in imposing disutility on offenders).
153. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (2007). According to one survey, all but six states
mandate indemnification when a director or officer prevails in a criminal case on the merits.
Pamela H. Bucy, Indemnification of Corporate Executives Who Have Been Convicted of
Crimes: An Assessment and Proposal, 24 IND. L. REV. 279, 287 (1991).
154. Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate
Disclosure of Details Concerning Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Policies, 154
U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1162-74 (2006).
155. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2007). It seems odd, or least calls for
explanation, that Delaware law would afford a mistake-of-law claim in determining
entitlement to indemnification irrespective of whether the underlying criminal law
recognizes an executive’s lack of belief that her actions were “unlawful” as a defense.
156. Id. § 145(e).
157. Id. § 145(d). Of course, shareholder vote is almost never used because it is
burdensome, and directors and retained counsel are limited in their genuine independence
from management. BISHOP, supra note 146, § 6:31; Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and
Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77
YALE L.J. 1078, 1079-80 (1968).
158. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f) (2007); see Brown, supra note 64, at 28-32
(arguing that if the state’s policy on indemnification and advancement does not frown on
firms that fulfill preexisting contractual obligations, firms and managers will simply contract
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Other regimes have tweaked this scheme, to further fairly obvious policy
objectives. For example, California law appears to provide that indemnification
is not available for an agent who prevails in litigation on merely technical
grounds.159 New York law requires special disclosure to shareholders about the
corporation’s indemnification policies and actions.160 The Model Business
Corporations Act provides that, in order to obtain advancement, an agent must
affirm that she has a good faith belief that she has met the relevant standard of
conduct and so may obtain indemnification.161
Federal agencies have sometimes pursued policies about indemnification
that disfavor it more than state law. As discussed in Part I, prior DOJ policy
contained a proviso that a prosecutor “may” consider whether a firm is
protecting culpable agents through providing attorneys’ fees. This statement,
and the practices of some federal prosecutors acting in accordance with it,
generated heated complaints that caused the DOJ to modify the policy.162 The
DOJ’s new McNulty Memo provides that a prosecutor in exercising her
discretion “generally should not take into account” whether a firm is advancing
litigation costs to any individual.163 Advancement may be considered only with
the approval of the Deputy Attorney General and only in an “extremely rare
case” in which a firm uses advancement to impede an investigation.164
The SEC has not modified its position on indemnification. It explained in
one recent enforcement action that a company’s expansion of the scope of
employees who could be indemnified against the consequences of the SEC’s
ex ante for advancement and indemnification in most or all cases, removing such activities
from the state’s charging and settlement calculus). Delaware law contains similar rules
governing the indemnification activities of partnerships and limited liability companies. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 15-110, 17-108, 18-108 (2007).
159. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(a) (2007) (following the Model Business
Corporations Act but omitting the words “or otherwise” after “on the merits” in statutory
formulation); see also Grover R. Heyler, Indemnification of Corporate Agents, 23 UCLA L.
REV. 1255, 1262 (1976). California law also gives courts authority to review a corporation’s
determination that the standard for permissive indemnification has been met. CAL. CORP.
CODE § 317(e) (2007). Delaware law holds that defendants are entitled to partial
indemnification if they prevail on one count of a criminal indictment but not on others.
Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138, 141 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
160. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 725 (2007). New York law also permits a director or
officer to apply to a court for indemnification if the corporation denies it. Id. § 724.
161. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.53(a)(1) (2004). The Act also provides for courtordered indemnification. Id. § 8.54.
162. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 3; see also COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS.
REGULATION, supra note 11; id. at 91 (“[The SEC should] revers[e] its longstanding position
that indemnification of directors for damages awarded in Section 11 actions is against public
policy . . . .”); U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 169
(2007), available at http://www.uschamber.com/publications/reports/0703capmarketscomm
(arguing that DOJ should not base charging decisions on information relating to
indemnification).
163. McNulty Memo, supra note 6, at 11.
164. Id. at 11 n.3.
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action, including attorneys’ fees, “without being required to do so by state law
or its corporate charter” was a factor causing the SEC to find that the company
had failed adequately to cooperate in the inquiry.165 The SEC has declared that
indemnification for the costs of violating the securities laws is contrary to
desirable policy and should be disallowed, although federal courts appear
divided on whether to advance the SEC’s position by denying indemnification
for securities liability.166 The SEC’s position is consistent with the traditional
approach of insurers, who generally refuse to write policies covering
intentional violations of law.167
2. The firm context and prescriptions
Again, it is beneficial to view this problem in terms of the structural
characteristics of wrongdoing in the firm context.

165. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 9.
166. 17 C.F.R. § 229.510 (2007) (requiring inclusion of language in registration
statements warning investors if the company indemnifies against securities violations and
informing investors that the SEC views such indemnification as contrary to the policy of the
securities laws); id. § 229.512(h) (requiring disclosure in registration statements of a
corporation’s indemnification provisions); 10 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES
REGULATION 4724 n.530 (3d ed. rev. 2005) (describing how the Trust Indenture Act
prohibits indemnification of certain persons for judgment costs and expenses). Compare
Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 876 F.2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1989) (en banc)
(agreeing with the SEC position that providing a right to indemnification for violators of
securities laws would undermine the deterrent effect of laws), Laventhol, Krekstein,
Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, 637 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1980) (same), and Globus v. Law
Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969) (same), with Raychem Corp. v. Fed. Ins.
Co., 853 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (rejecting the SEC position for cases in which the
defendant settles, as opposed to cases in which the defendant is found at trial to have
violated securities laws). The SEC does not take a similarly dim view of a company insuring
against liability for violations of securities law. Griffith, supra note 154, at 1197-98; see also
10 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra, at 4733 (speculating that the SEC takes a less dim view of
insurance because its presence increases investor recovery).
167. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (2007) (precluding coverage for willful but not
for negligent acts); Bucy, supra note 153, at 332-34 (describing the exclusions in standard
policies covering liability of directors and officers); LoPucki, supra note 30, at 73 (“In
recognition of the moral hazard involved in insuring against liability for certain kinds of
intentional harm, courts void such coverage as contrary to public policy.”); Mary Coate
McNeely, Illegality as a Factor in Liability Insurance, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 26, 30-60 (1941)
(arguing that insurance law and contracts have been forced to draw lines excluding coverage
for certain illegal conduct so as not to increase crime and have generally done so according
to distinctions between mala prohibita and mala in se); see also Bucy, supra note 153, at
310-11 (noting that public policy arguments against indemnification grew out of insurance
law). Insurance coverage has now expanded in the corporate context to cover even conduct
against which corporations are not legally authorized to indemnify. Griffith, supra note 154,
at 1162-68.
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a. Effects of the firm
First, the effects of inserting the firm between the individual and the
state—on the incidence of crime ex ante and on the effectiveness of
investigating crime ex post—are highly relevant. The availability of
indemnification assures managers ex ante that they will not face financial ruin
as a result of legal proceedings for conduct on the job.168 This assurance causes
managerial talent to be efficiently allocated by removing a factor that would
otherwise chill managers from accepting offers of employment, and it causes
managers to engage in desirable risk-taking once they begin employment.
These points are especially strong in the business firm context because the
nature of applicable substantive prohibitions means that instances of
wrongdoing are often coincident with and closely related to valuable economic
activity. Indemnification by the firm is preferable to self-insurance by
managers because the firm is a more efficient risk-bearer across all cases of
wrongdoing and all employment relationships, especially in the case of a public
company whose shareholder owners can diversify their portfolios.169
However, it is also true that the more funding a person can use to litigate
with the state, the lower the probability that a sanction will be imposed for an
act of wrongdoing. And probability of sanction is at least as important as—
many have concluded more important than—severity of sanction in
determining the effectiveness of legal prohibitions in deterring violations.170
The principal cost of indemnification is that it reduces deterrence ex ante, even
if limited to litigation costs.171 Reduction in deterrence will be greatest where,
as in most criminal cases, the applicable legal prohibition concerns an
intentional violation of law.172 Indemnification may lead managers to engage in

168. See Bucy, supra note 153, at 312-13, 338-39; Griffith, supra note 154, at 117071; Kraakman, supra note 41, at 864-65; see also Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204,
218 (Del. 2005) (discussing how permitting corporate advancement enhances benefits to
shareholders by facilitating the corporation’s ability to attract and retain managers).
169. See Griffith, supra note 154, at 1168-69.
170. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169, 178 (1968); John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A
Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1145, 1193 (1984).
171. Bucy, supra note 153, at 342-43; see also Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Richard
Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary System? A General Theory of Litigation Advice
and Its Regulation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 313, 391 (1991); LoPucki, supra note 30, at 14-38. It
has been argued that “payment of attorneys’ fees by a corporation is not a failure of
cooperation unless one views the presence of a lawyer for a corporate officer as an
impediment to an investigation.” Peter J. Henning, Targeting Legal Advice, 54 AM. U. L.
REV. 669, 673 (2005). It is an empirical rather than normative assertion that lawyers are
impediments to sanctioning. The normative question is under what conditions we should
welcome that impediment and under what conditions it is socially undesirable.
172. LoPucki, supra note 30, at 72-73.
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excessive risk taking, which imposes costs on firms that may result in a net
expected loss from risk-taking activities.
There is also an agency cost problem with indemnification. The agents who
are most likely to have occasion to use indemnification (top managers) are the
same agents most likely to exercise control over ex ante decisions about
indemnification policy and specific expenditures for indemnification ex post.
They may also be the agents in a position to do the most harm through
wrongdoing.173 The agency cost problem is particularly acute as to criminal
litigation costs because an agent facing potential loss of liberty has incentive to
spend limitless resources of the firm on a defense; it is easily possible to spend
tens of millions of dollars in such circumstances.174
Perhaps policy choices about indemnification produce rules that alter the
form but not the substance of bargaining.175 The choices will be choices
among, at most, various transaction costs. If the law prohibits indemnification
for legal costs (indeed, even if it prohibited ex ante contracting for
indemnification), agents negotiating for employment with firms will demand
extra wages to offset their expected costs of having to defend against legal
charges or having to purchase insurance for such costs.176 This may be less
efficient than firm-funded insurance or indemnification, and it will not result in
greater deterrence.
Or so the argument goes. The Coasean insight seems like it could be
subject to two qualifications in this context. First, agents probably have limited
ability to demand compensation or contractual guarantees for expected costs of
engaging in criminal acts and facing legal proceedings as a result. Second, as
173. Ridder v. CityFed Fin. Corp., 47 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 1995) (giving the executive’s
claim for advancement of expenses out of the assets of the illiquid corporation priority over
creditors who claimed that advancement would dissipate assets); Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d
1208, 1212 (2d Cir. 1978) (“It is asking too much of human nature to expect that the
disinterested directors will view with the necessary objectivity the actions of their colleagues
in a situation where an adverse decision would be likely to result in considerable expense
and liability for the individuals concerned.”); In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 323 B.R. 345
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (addressing whether managers who were subject to numerous civil
and criminal claims for looting a corporation were entitled to payments from the corporation
for the advancement and indemnification that they authorized for themselves); Kraakman,
supra note 41, at 859 (“[I]t is precisely . . . among top corporate decisionmakers, that
contractual devices and legal policies function most effectively to deflect personal legal
risks.”).
174. See, e.g., Mary Flood, Skilling Due to Get Some Cash, HOUSTON CHRON., June
15, 2004, at B1 (reporting that two years before the former Enron CEO’s trial, $23 million
had been paid to a law firm for his defense); Maureen Orth, Black Mischief, VANITY FAIR,
Feb. 2007, at 164 (reporting that former newspaper executive Conrad Black, awaiting trial
on criminal fraud charges based on alleged looting of corporate assets, has expended more
than $100 million on his legal defense, with most of it coming from corporate funds).
175. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
176. Kornhauser, supra note 38, at 1358. But see id. at 1357 (prohibiting insurance or
indemnification might result in replacement by “complicated contractual devices that were
more costly to implement”).
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noted, the disutility of imprisonment generally cannot be offset by monetary
compensation, at least not for substantial terms of imprisonment. And, even if
one thought it could be offset in theory, agents who have never suffered
imprisonment would struggle to calculate ex ante how much compensation to
demand for any given expected term of incarceration.
b. Slow ripening of the criminal case
The indemnification issue also connects to the phenomenon of the slow
ripening of most criminal cases within firms. Consider a spectrum of cases. In
Case A, the most desirable case for indemnification for litigation costs, a lowerlevel employee who is without substantial resources and merely a witness to
wrongdoing needs the assistance of counsel because she has received an
interview request early in an investigation of wrongdoing. Especially given her
self-incrimination dilemma (which may apply to some extent even if she is
purely a witness) and the reasonable assertion that her obligations as a witness
are a job responsibility, considerations of both utility to the system and fairness
to the individual tilt clearly in favor of indemnification.
Case A is fairly common but so are two more difficult cases. In Case C, the
least desirable one for indemnification, a high-level manager loots millions
from the firm, is indicted, and turns around and demands limitless funding of a
protracted defense out of the firm’s assets. In Case B, the middle case, a
manager engages in an “aggressive” transaction that may or may not turn out to
be criminal, depending on specific facts bearing on mental state that will take a
long time for the legal system to develop and analyze; this manager demands
firm assets to fund the litigation that is necessary to determine the propriety of
the manager’s conduct (and therefore the desirability of indemnification).177
The optimal conditions for, and level of, indemnification are moving
targets in Cases B and C, especially in Case B. The usual response is a regime
of “advancement.”178 Under such a system, all three agents in the above cases
are fully entitled to firm funding for their litigation costs. However, all three
must supply an undertaking, that is, a contractual obligation to repay their
litigation costs to the firm if they are found liable on the merits.179
177. Henning, supra note 171, at 698-99.
178. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (2007); In re Adelphia Commc’ns, 323
B.R. at 375; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.53(a) (2004); Bucy, supra note 153, at 316-19.
179. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (2007); Bucy, supra note 153, at 316-19; see also
Happ v. Corning, Inc., 466 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2006) (rejecting the claim of an employee who
had been convicted of insider trading that the undertaking he signed to repay defense costs
was unenforceable because the corporation procured his agreement through duress). The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which among other things prohibited most corporate loans to
executives, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (2007), could be read as barring advancement. However, it is
highly unlikely either that the legislation was intended to have that effect or that a court
would apply it that way. 2 WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 22.14, at 22-40.3 to -40.8 (7th ed. 2006).
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(Advancement regimes can set the conditions in various ways, such as by
limiting the repayment obligation to criminal violations, intentional violations,
decisions on the merits versus dismissals for procedural flaws, and so on.)
The obvious flaw in such a regime is that a firm’s ability to achieve a
“claw back” of its advancement is severely limited.180 A criminal defendant
facing a serious sentence of imprisonment has little incentive to leave her own
assets unspent at the end of a case, and sanctioning regimes (fines, forfeiture,
restitution, and the like) are apt to take most or all of what may be left.
c. Special roles of counsel
Most firm actors enjoy a form of indemnification that goes virtually
unnoticed: transactional lawyers, paid by and working for the firm, supply ex
ante legal assistance to actors contemplating whether to engage in a particular
action or activity. From one perspective, this form of indemnification seems
highly desirable. Counsel operating effectively ex ante may serve a beneficial
gatekeeping function by giving the client advice that causes the client to forego
activity that would have violated the law.181 From another perspective,
however, this form of indemnification may be undesirable. Ex ante, counsel
may assist a client in pursuing an “aggressive” activity that either (1) impinges
more closely on the interests the applicable law seeks to protect than would a
more risk-averse behavior pursued in the absence of fine-tuned legal advice, or
(2) directly contravenes the law, or the interests the law seeks to protect, but is
insulated from later sanction by virtue of the client’s reliance on counsel.182
Access to costless, ex ante attorney services certainly advantages actors who
operate in the firm setting over those who operate at large.
With regard to litigation counsel, the direct provision of counsel by firms
(as opposed to indemnification for attorneys’ fees) often continues for some
period following an instance of potential wrongdoing. In its initial investigative
efforts, a firm usually will interview witnesses, gather and review documents,

180. Sykes, supra note 41, at 1243 (“[E]mpirical evidence suggests that principals very
rarely pursue their rights to indemnity against their agents.”); Phred Dvorak & Serena Ng,
Check, Please: Reclaiming Pay from Executives Is Tough to Do, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 20,
2006, at A1 (describing numerous cases in which corporations struggled with or abandoned
efforts to reclaim earnings-based bonuses paid to executives who achieved bonus targets by
engaging in fraud); see also William M. Bulkeley, CA Sues Ex-CEO to Recoup Legal Fee,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2006, at B2 (describing one case in which the corporation sought a
convicted former executive’s “house, sports cars, yacht and other assets” as repayment for
advanced defense costs).
181. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-93 (1981); Kaplow & Shavell,
supra note 11, at 597-98.
182. See William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional
Responsibilities of the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1455-64 (2006).
Kaplow and Shavell, supra note 11, at 600, do not recognize this problem in arguing that ex
ante legal advice is categorically beneficial to society while ex post advice is not.
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and advise managers and employees through a single (usually outside) counsel
who represents the firm rather than the managers and employees. This method
is often more efficient than the provision of separate counsel for all the relevant
actors, especially in matters that do not progress past, or much past, an initial
internal investigation. If the matter is not serious and can be disposed of
relatively quickly, both the firm and its agents benefit from dealing with a
single counsel paid by the firm. As I discussed in Part II, however, when
matters become more serious and the stakes grow higher, firm counsel’s role in
an investigation following wrongdoing can become confusing to the firm’s
agents and prone to conflict.
When separate counsel are therefore retained to represent firm agents—a
common occurrence in serious matters involving investigation by both the firm
and the state—it is necessary to distinguish among several situations in which
the firm’s agents might find themselves. The DOJ’s “status” categories are
useful here.183 A “witness” is someone whom investigators believe has
knowledge of probative facts but for whom the current evidence does not
suggest any possibility of liability. A “subject” is someone for whom current
evidence suggests a possibility of liability. A “target” is someone whom
investigators believe is likely to be charged. As a matter progresses from the
stage of earliest investigation all the way to the stage (if reached) of final
sanctioning, individuals often move from one category to another and the
information about—and therefore degree of confidence in—an individual’s
placement in a particular category rises. The desirability of indemnification for
legal expenses might turn not only on the nature of counsel’s role but also on
the position of the client whom counsel represents in relation to the matter
subject to inquiry or sanctioning.
d. Prescriptions
To assess the recent controversy about the state’s policies on
indemnification for attorneys’ fees, one should distinguish legal incentives
from allocation of institutional authority. As a debate about legal incentives, the
fracas over indemnification for litigation costs has been misguided and mostly
unhelpful. The effort to give this discussion constitutional valence is a red
herring (some might think an offensive one). And it is rational to maintain that
overly permissive advancement and indemnification regimes fail to force
managers of large firms, whose wrongdoing can impose great social harm, to
internalize sufficiently the costs of their delicts—in terms of both ex ante
behavioral calculus and who foots the bill for wrongdoing ex post.184

183. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-11.151 (2007),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/index.html.
184. Kraakman, supra note 41, at 877.
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The useful move is not to say, in a broad brush manner, that the state
should be banned from disfavoring advancement or that the law should give
employees wide access to employer funding through a cause of action in
implied contract.185 The DOJ, in modifying its policies on this issue, missed an
opportunity to engage the substance of the applicable questions of law and
policy. It is telling that the McNulty Memo both bans consideration of
advancement and recognizes that advancement could be used to impede public
enforcement objectives. The memo makes no effort to identify a theory for
distinguishing cases of legitimate (desirable) advancement from cases of
obstructive (undesirable) advancement, other than to assert that the latter cases,
whatever they look like, are “rare.” Leaving aside what one might ultimately
conclude in a balanced analysis of policy considerations, it is undeniably true
that a firm’s selection and funding of counsel for its agents, in relation to a
situation in which a firm does not do so, does impede regulation.
Consideration of the advancement problem requires confronting a mix of
benefits and costs, together with the challenging problem of sorting cases
according to the temporal point at which advancement becomes undesirable
(and any claw back illusory). A conceivable result of such an analysis would be
a regime treating advancement more like a loan and less like a right.186 An
agent’s undertaking would be accompanied by the agent granting the firm some
form of priority of claim over the agent’s assets.187
Such a regime might also tinker with standards that determine: (1) the level
of misconduct, in terms of substantive law including elements of mental state,
past which advancement should not be provided; (2) the stage of the litigation
past which advancement should not be provided (e.g., an initial interview with
an enforcer versus a certiorari petition following conviction and sentence); and
(3) absolute limits on what a firm should pay in terms of any one agent’s
litigation costs.188 A balanced legal regime might also make distinctions

185. Brown, supra note 64, at 4 (“[T]he view that best explains defense counsel
regulation is a largely instrumental one that balances adjudication accuracy and law
enforcement effectiveness against fairness and defendants’ self-interest.”).
186. Bucy, supra note 153, at 349. At one time, some believed that statutory
requirements of an “undertaking” included the necessity of a bond, though that is no longer
how advancement statutes are read. See William E. Knepper, Officers and Directors:
Indemnification and Liability Insurance—An Update, 30 BUS. LAW. 951, 953 (1975).
187. But see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.53(b) & cmts. (2004) (rejecting requirement
of security for an undertaking on the ground that it would favor directors with greater
financial resources).
188. In terms of the level of misconduct, one helpful resource might be the Delaware
Supreme Court’s recent decision in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27
(Del. 2006). In that case, the court explored the distinctions among three forms of corporate
manager behavior sometimes covered by the label “bad faith”: (1) conduct motivated by an
intent to do harm (“subjective bad faith”); (2) intentional dereliction of duty or conscious
disregard of one’s responsibilities (“bad faith”); and (3) conduct involving lack of due care
(not “bad faith” even if the negligence is gross). Id. at 63-68. The court concluded that
category (2) conduct should be “treated as a non-exculpable, non-indemnifiable violation of
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according to agents’ relationship to a particular instance of wrongdoing; the
DOJ’s “witness,” “subject,” and “target” categories might be useful in this
regard.
It is not unreasonable for an executive branch agency to take the position,
for example, that firms serious about encouraging legal compliance do not
provide their employees with limitless assets to fund their defenses in cases of
clear criminal wrongdoing. If it is reasonable to take such a position, it must be
reasonable to think about how to give that position teeth, including by saying
that enforcers will consider firms’ practices in the exercise of charging and
settlement discretion. Legal rules cannot restrict managers from bargaining for
compensation to set off legal restrictions in their access to indemnification
(short of contract law declaring such deals void). However, managers may lack
bargaining power with regard to expected costs of criminal violations. While
there might be substantial disagreement about what kind and degree of
indemnification are socially desirable, and about the most effective shape of
legal rules, there is general agreement that indemnification can affect
deterrence and that its blanket use is likely to be problematic.
But the present controversy runs beyond the contours of optimal legal
incentives to the question of who should make such policy; indeed, the latter
concern is likely generating more heat than the former. The critics of federal
executive branch practices presume that Delaware, and other states, should
have the exclusive authority to weigh interests and issue legal rules.189 Senator
Specter’s bill can be seen as a directive to the federal executive branch to exit
this realm of corporate law. The DOJ’s change of course in the McNulty Memo
can be seen as a concession that the DOJ’s prior policies on advancement had
stepped outside the DOJ’s proper regulatory role.
As I will discuss further in Part IV, whether an institutional perspective on
the question of indemnification in organizational criminal cases is the right
response, and leads to the right result, requires comparative evaluation of the
DOJ and the SEC (and perhaps other agencies) as institutional actors. Suffice it
to say that if the indemnification controversy largely arises from institutional
concerns, the debate ought to focus on real comparative assessment of
institutions, not on unhelpful, broad-brush assertions such as that
indemnification is uniformly desirable or that discouraging indemnification
violates constitutional rights.

the fiduciary duty to act in good faith.” Id. at 66; see also Globus v. Law Research Serv.,
Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969) (denying indemnification for liability for securities
violation where defendant “committed a sin graver than ordinary negligence”).
189. See Robert B. Ahdieh, From “Federalization” to “Mixed Governance” in
Corporate Law: A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 721 (2005); Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1793 (2006).
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IV. ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS
Before concluding, I will briefly address three significant features of this
Article’s subject that, for various reasons, need not be fully resolved here. They
are the overbreadth of criminal enterprise liability, the allocation of institutional
authority to make policy in this area, and the controversy over the treatment of
firms’ attorney-client privilege and work-product claims.
A. Overbreadth of Enterprise Liability
Criminal procedure within firms is practiced in the large shadow of
criminal enterprise liability. Special features of this form of liability complicate
analysis of criminal procedure. Under current law, a firm faces criminal
liability for virtually any criminal act by an agent. The standard is respondeat
superior: the master is liable if the agent acted within the scope of employment
and at least in part to benefit the master.190 In practice, this standard amounts to
strict vicarious liability because almost any act on the job is “within the scope
of employment” and because courts have all but read the “intent to benefit”
element out of the law.191 In addition, a firm’s practices and procedures
designed to prevent agent wrongdoing supply no defense to liability, although
they usually mitigate punishment.192
As I discussed in detail in Part II, this standard might advance an agenda of
using enterprise liability as a means of encouraging firms to control their agents
(although it sometimes can have perverse effects193). Forcing firms to
internalize the costs of agent violations, coupled with enhancing compensation
of harmed persons, justifies vicarious liability in tort law, where it is a bedrock
feature of legal regimes.194 But criminal law is and should be more concerned
with fault distinctions. Organizational causation of individual crime is both real
and complex. Normatively, not all cases of agent crime are cases of
organizational crime. It depends on the relationship between the agent’s act and
190. 1 KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY §§ 3:01-:11, at 89-145
(2d ed. 1992); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (2004) (stating that
respondeat superior doctrine governs in tort law).
191. See, e.g., United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d 9, 25 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v.
Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 970 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v.
Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 406-07 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Gold,
743 F.2d 800, 822-23 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241-42 (1st
Cir. 1982); United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1979); Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127-29 (5th Cir. 1962).
192. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972); U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (2006).
193. See Arlen, supra note 41.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 39-45; see also Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v.
United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk
Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 544-45 (1961); Young B. Smith, Frolic
and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 456 (1923).
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its organizational context. Sometimes organizations are blameworthy for what
their people do, and sometimes they are not. Respondeat superior is an
overbroad doctrine in the criminal context because it does not comport with
blaming practices.195
The overbreadth of criminal vicarious liability also poses a temporal
problem. If the state can level an organizational charge against a firm anytime
an employee commits an offense on the job, the state’s bargaining leverage can
cause a firm to believe it has no alternative but to settle—regardless of the
firm’s view of the merits. This dynamic is most acute early in a matter, before
the firm and the state have developed the facts to a point that would permit
fully informed assessment of the merits. Firms may find themselves needing to
purge, repent, and reform before knowing whether they have sinned.196
An obvious response would be to narrow criminal enterprise liability—the
imposition of which involves (or should involve) a degree of fault attribution
absent in many civil matters. But this is difficult to do. Epistemic barriers to
describing the phenomenon of how organizations influence individual acts
make it impossible to craft a workable legal rule that selects for sanction only
those cases in which an organization is to blame for its agent’s act.197 Previous
attempts to do so have generated proposals that suffer from serious problems of
under- and overbreadth.198 I have suggested elsewhere an incremental move:
fortify the “intent to benefit” element in existing respondeat superior doctrine
by applying the criminal enterprise sanction only if an agent genuinely and

195. Buell, supra note 31, at 526-27. While some believe that criminal enterprise
liability has little instrumental value and ought to be abandoned, I have argued that it is a
useful supplement to civil enterprise liability, in part because it carries additional sanctioning
effects (primarily in the form of reputational sanctions) that civil regulation cannot impose
and that can influence organizational culture in ways that individual sanctions cannot. Id. at
498-525. For other contributions to this debate, see Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A
Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095 (1991); John C.
Coffee, Jr., “No Soul To Damn: No Body To Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the
Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981); Daniel R. Fischel & Alan
O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319 (1996); Lawrence Friedman, In Defense
of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 833 (2000); Dan M. Kahan,
Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609 (1998); V.S.
Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1477 (1996); William S. Laufer & Alan Strudler, Corporate Intentionality, Desert, and
Variants of Vicarious Liability, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1285 (2000); Eliezer Lederman,
Criminal Law, Perpetrator and Corporation: Rethinking a Complex Triangle, 76 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 285 (1985); Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing
Corporate Misconduct, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1997, at 23; Gerhard O.W.
Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21 (1957).
196. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 27, at 748.
197. Buell, supra note 31, at 527-30.
198. Id. Some have suggested guidelines that would result in essentially no
prosecutions. See, e.g., COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 11, at 85 (“[The
DOJ should] revise its prosecutorial guidelines so that firms are only prosecuted in
exceptional circumstances of pervasive culpability throughout all offices and ranks.”).
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primarily acts for the purpose of furthering objectives of the firm.199 Of course,
some narrowing can be accomplished through constraining enforcement
discretion; this has been the primary motivation for (and value in) the DOJ’s
corporate charging policies (the McNulty Memo and its predecessors). These
policies require federal prosecutors to consider a host of factors relating to
institutional blameworthiness in determining which among the many cases of
respondeat superior liability merit actual prosecution.200
But even under a narrower form of enterprise liability, firms could be
expected to assert an important facet of their current objection. This would be
the claim that mere criminal allegation, not ultimate liability, is what makes a
firm’s position untenable. Firms assert that because an indictment sounds the
death knell for a business enterprise, they have no choice but to concede
liability and settle before the charging decision is even reached.
This claim is oversimplified. As an empirical matter, a criminal charge
does not consign any business enterprise to death. Many firms, including large
public companies, have survived being charged and even convicted of
crimes.201 The phenomenon of death-by-indictment is probably limited to what
might be called “eggshell logo” firms: businesses that depend on reputation in a
manner and to a degree that makes them highly vulnerable to even an allegation
of criminality. To be sure, a more tangible problem for firms that need licenses
to do business is potential loss of licensure due to indictment. However,
licensing regimes need not treat the filing of a charge as the trigger for
mandatory revocation, and reinstatement or waiver of revocation is usually
negotiable in settlement.
As a theoretical matter, it is not clear why the mere filing of a charge
should cause liquidation of an enterprise. Actual legal sanctions in a criminal
(or other regulatory) matter are usually matched, and often dwarfed, by
potential civil liability that nearly always accompanies a case of serious
wrongdoing. So is it the mere label “criminal” that sets off a death spiral? It is
not clear why an executive branch official or a grand jury raising allegations of
criminal liability would be so different from the same statement coming from
the pages of the Wall Street Journal, from a whistleblower, or by some other
public mechanism. Logically, the facts should drive reputational effects more
than the label given to those facts, and certainly more than the identity of the
person or institution affixing the label. Even reputationally sensitive firms have

199. Buell, supra note 31, at 530-34.
200. McNulty Memo, supra note 6, at 2-5; Thompson Memo, supra note 6, at 1-4.
Another response would be to limit prosecutors’ plea bargaining power through
constitutional doctrine, but the Supreme Court has never demonstrated interest in doing this,
and it would raise complex doctrinal problems affecting the whole criminal justice system.
Brown, supra note 64, at 25-26.
201. See, e.g., In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1225 (9th Cir. 2001); In re
Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd. P’ships Litig., 163 F.R.D. 200, 203-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Joann S.
Lublin, Bristol-Myers to Settle U.S. Probe, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2005, at A3.
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settled charges with admissions of criminal wrongdoing (even if short of formal
guilty pleas) without suffering collapse.202
Although the effects of enterprise liability are empirically and theoretically
puzzling, one might still ask whether there is a means of ameliorating death-byindictment risk, regardless of whether or not it is common. One response, of
course, would be to say that firms are so vulnerable to charging that the
criminal process just cannot be applied to them—ever. But it would be a
strange response for the state to abandon a legal regime because it is
expressively too potent, especially where the expressive power comes not from
the legal regime tapping into an atavistic or unpalatable impulse but from the
public learning something material about the firm.203 Put differently, it is hard
to see how the state has an obligation to help a regulated entity prevent the
social consequences of its own delict.
A somewhat more moderate position would be to say that some institutions
are so vulnerable that they should enjoy a kind of immunity from the otherwise
applicable regime. This is essentially what is meant when it is said that a
particular firm is “too big to fail.”204 But this argument also is strange. It is
difficult to think of a regulatory regime that includes a carve-out for some
categories of actors whose conduct falls within the regime but who are just too
vulnerable to sanctions to be regulated. It is difficult if not impossible to see
how one could pursue such an agenda through law. And any such regime could
generate bad incentives, causing firms to structure themselves in a manner that
facilitates the argument that “we are too big and too vulnerable to be charged.”
Aside from narrowing the scope of enterprise criminal liability where
feasible, how else might problems associated with its sometimes extreme
potency be ameliorated? One possibility would be for the executive branch to
institute a regime of procedure in such cases that requires a cooling period
during which charging decisions and settlement discussions would not be
permitted pending full development of the facts.205 Another relatively easy
move would be to alter licensing regimes to make their consequences turn on
conviction, not charging. One could also choose patience. As more
organizational cases are pursued, and some result in findings of no liability
after litigation, the expressive force of a mere charge might slacken, or at least
vary according to the seriousness and content of the wrongdoing, rather than
202. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, KPMG to Pay $456 Million for Criminal
Violations in Relation to Largest-Ever Tax Shelter Fraud Case (Aug. 29, 2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/August/05_ag_433.html; see also Jonathan Weil,
KPMG’s Settlement Provides for New Start, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2005, at C1.
203. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743,
1749-54 (2005).
204. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and
the Need to Restructure the Industry Before It Unravels, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1698 (2006).
205. This would not always work to firms’ advantage. Sometimes firms urge the state
to reach a decision quickly, in hopes that a declination to charge will clear a cloud over the
firm.
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the mere presence or absence of a criminal charge. Indeed, more litigation
(especially trials) is likely to benefit everyone by dissipating the current de
facto, and more or less exclusive, power of prosecutors to dictate the scope of
enterprise liability.
In any event, debate over the status of corporate criminal liability is no
reason to neglect problems of criminal procedure that arise in its shadow.
Positive law has included criminal enterprise liability for over a century, and it
is likely to persist.206 Even if criminal enterprise liability were abolished,
procedural problems and controversies would remain. One would still need to
ask how to think about procedure for investigating and prosecuting individual
crime within firms in the shadow of a regime of negotiable civil enterprise
liability that provided firms with the same array of incentives (even if to a
lesser degree) as under present regimes.207
B. Institutional Roles and Competency
A response to much of what I said in Part III might be the following:
whether or not I located the correct balancing points in considering what
protection should be afforded to employer-compelled statements and the
optimal structure of indemnification policies is beside the point. The real
question is which institutional actor should make those policy decisions and by
what process. Executive branch lawyers enforcing conduct rules in the courts,
the argument would proceed, are the wrong actors; case-specific litigation is the
wrong process. One might also add that, even among executive branch
enforcers, prosecutors are undesirable actors—for any number of reasons.208
At least part of this assertion is uncomplicated. It is preferable to have
Congress legislate federal criminal procedure in the firm context by giving
statutory content to choices about how to treat employer-compelled statements,
privileged materials, indemnification payments, and so on. The legislative
process, at least in ideal form, has two primary advantages: robust, democratic
deliberation ex ante and the production of specific and relatively non-pliable
legal rules ex post.
But it would be naïve to think of Congress in ideal terms. Any push for
legal reform must compete for attention on a crowded agenda. The project of
reforming criminal procedure for organizational cases may fail to capture

206. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494-96 (1909);
see also 1 BRICKEY, supra note 190.
207. See Khanna, supra note 195, at 1520-25 (contending that a regime of civil
enforcement could provide regulators with many of same powers as regime of criminal
enterprise liability); Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution
in a Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1095, 1107-33 (2006) (surveying policies of many civil regulatory bodies governing
discretion to use enterprise sanctions).
208. See Brown, supra note 64, at 4-5.
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Congress’s attention, or at least enough of it to allow for a thorough balancing
of interests. As in many contexts, other legal institutions may be compelled to
act where Congress has not. Even if Congress does act, in the absence of full
consideration, it may legislate erroneously, possibly worsening matters (as I
have argued would be the case with Senator Specter’s bill). Also, statutory law
has limits. Even an ideal congressional process is likely to leave plenty of work
for other institutions when it comes time to enforce and interpret statutes.
Finally, Congress may pursue policies that undesirably favor narrow interests
due to public choice pressures.
This leads to a facet of the institutional objection that is more complicated
than the assertion that legislatures in general are better positioned than other
legal institutions to make law. Evaluating the objection requires comparative
analysis. The question is not so much whether a particular executive branch
agency, standing alone, is well situated to make policy on organizational
criminal procedure but whether that agency is better or worse than other
institutions that are viable alternatives.
As to any particular practice, one needs to ask whether (and, if so, why) the
DOJ is a less desirable actor than Congress, another executive branch agency
such as the SEC, the Delaware legislature and courts or those of another state,
Article III courts, state attorneys general, self-regulatory organizations, and so
on. These are complex inquiries meriting a separate article. Suffice it to say that
it is not self-evident either that the DOJ, as an institutional actor, is utterly
undesirable or that it would be entirely unproblematic.
On one hand, executive branch policymaking through the litigation process
is ubiquitous and, in many areas, well settled. Enforcement of the law
inevitably includes a large element of making law by the state signaling what
will lead to sanction within realms of conduct covered by broad statutory
schemes. On the other hand, prosecutors acting under broad grants of
legislative authority may err in where they set those boundaries and, without
sufficient supervision and control, may wander beyond the limits of positive
law. The latter concern especially arises in criminal cases involving firms
because almost all of them now settle, at the enterprise level, in the form of
deferred prosecution agreements, often including extensive reform measures
that represent a kind of regulation by settlement.209
Short of a full-blown inquiry into the institutional question, it is safe to say
that more legislative guidance ex ante and more court supervision ex post
(especially of settlements, which currently lack real supervision) are desirable
to ameliorate risks and costs when executive branch enforcers act as
policymakers.210 However, some policymaking through enforcement may be

209. This aspect of enterprise liability, and the problems it raises, are thoroughly
treated in Garrett, supra note 45.
210. Id. As Garrett explains, developing workable mechanisms for judicial oversight
of these settlements is a difficult challenge. Id. at 48-57.
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both desirable in the absence of legislative action and inevitable as a gap-filler
even if legislation is enacted.
C. Firms’ Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Claims
Last, a word about the element of current controversy that has generated
the most heat: the state’s practice of obtaining waivers from firms of firms’
rights to protect information through the attorney-client privilege and the workproduct doctrine. I have omitted this issue largely because three current
treatments deal with it thoroughly and informatively.211 In addition, the waiver
phenomenon relates primarily to the position of the firm in relation to the state,
not the position of the individual (within the firm) in relation to the state.212
The three current papers view the state’s practices with regard to privilege
waiver as raising questions about how to structure legal rules to maximize
factual development about wrongdoing without generating perverse effects. All
conclude that it is a mistake to analyze the corporate attorney-client privilege as
if it were the same thing as the individual’s privilege and that waiver practices
are not categorically undesirable.213

211. Brown, supra note 12; Julie R. O’Sullivan, Does the DOJ’s Compelled-Voluntary
Privilege Waivers Policy Undermine Corporate Clients’ Willingness to Communicate with
Counsel and Counsel’s Ability to Ensure Corporate Legal Compliance? A Preliminary “No,”
(2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Daniel Richman, Decisions About
Coercion: The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver Problem, 56 DEPAUL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2007) (on file with author).
212. Of course, when firms waive privilege claims, they can seriously worsen the legal
position of individuals. Privileged materials may contain direct admissions by individuals or
other highly probative evidence of their wrongdoing. But this does not distinguish an
individual who engages in wrongdoing within a firm from one who engages in wrongdoing
on her own, unless the individual has been misled into thinking that the firm’s lawyer is her
lawyer. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 163(2) (1997)
(“[W]hen the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented non-client
misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer must make reasonable efforts to
correct the misunderstanding when failure to do so would materially prejudice the nonclient.”); id. § 163(2) cmt. e (“A constituent may mistakenly assume that the lawyer will act
to further the personal interests of the constituent, perhaps even against the interests of the
organization.”). To the extent that the individual’s special problem in the firm setting is that
she has spoken to someone (firm counsel) to whom she would not have spoken had events
occurred outside the firm, her problem relates to the issue of statements and Fifth
Amendment protections, which I addressed in Part III, not the attorney-client privilege.
213. Brown, supra note 12, at 922-35; O’Sullivan, supra note 211 (manuscript at 1431); Richman, supra note 211 (manuscript at 7-20). At least one of these authors questions
whether the corporate attorney-client privilege can be justified under the traditional
framework of policy analysis that has guided discussion of the individual privilege.
O’Sullivan, supra note 211 (manuscript at 40-61). It may be that the corporate privilege
survives—and that intrusions upon it meet such hot resistance—only because the privilege is
one of the few means firms have for controlling information in regulatory matters and
contests in which the state enjoys heavy bargaining leverage. See id. (manuscript at 60-64).
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I will add only that the present debate about corporate privilege waivers
(including discussion of the recent modifications to DOJ policy to make
waivers less common) would benefit from closer attention to the distinction
between the ex ante and ex post roles of corporate counsel, as I described them
in Part II.214 In most cases of criminal wrongdoing outside firms, no lawyer is
present or consulted at the time of the primary conduct; the lawyer appears
after the fact, when the potential for sanctioning arises. In most cases of
criminal wrongdoing inside firms, at least some lawyers are present and are at
least partially consulted at the time of the primary conduct.
Given that attorney involvement in transactional activity is now ubiquitous,
a firm’s attorney-client privilege could amount to a privilege protecting intraorganizational communications.215 A motivational concern amplifies this
worry. The existence of a privilege with broad scope would be a strong
incentive to involve lawyers in intra-organizational communications in order to
shield such communications from discovery.216 The DOJ’s new guidance about
privilege waivers by firms, while clearer than its predecessor, does not
sufficiently address the problem of distinguishing among types of legal advice
and types of work product when determining the desirability of privilege
waivers.217

214. The Supreme Court failed to do this in the defining case about the attorney-client
privilege of business firms, Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392-93 & n.2 (1981),
in which the Court confusingly justified protection of lower-level employee’s statements to
ex post counsel in internal investigations with arguments about the value of ex ante legal
advice.
215. An even harder problem is how to develop facts about wrongdoing within a law
firm or other lawyer organization. See, e.g., First Superseding Indictment, United States v.
Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman LLP, No. CR 05-587(A)-DDP (C.D. Cal. May 18,
2006), available at http://www.law.com/pdf/ca/milberg_indictment.pdf.
216. See, e.g., Matt Richtel, H.P. Investigators Sought Meeting with Top Leaders, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2006, at C3 (describing an email in which the corporation’s in-house lawyer
explained that the general counsel asked him to “oversee” an internal inquiry into leaks,
which later resulted in criminal charges against persons participating in the leak
investigation, so that communications relating to the investigation would be protected from
disclosure by the attorney-client privilege in the event of litigation or regulatory scrutiny).
217. The new policy recognizes the distinction between ex ante and ex post
involvement of counsel and correctly prioritizes materials relating to ex ante transactional
advice in terms of their importance to the investigation of misconduct within firms. McNulty
Memo, supra note 6, at 8-11. However, the new DOJ guidance muddles the distinction
between privileged communications and attorney work product and is confusing in other
respects. It supports waiver of material (“purely factual information relating . . . to the
underlying misconduct”) that would seem to include documents and witness statements
gathered by counsel investigating ex post. Id. at 9. But it simultaneously disfavors waiver of
material (“attorney-client communications or non-factual attorney work product”) that
arguably both includes and excludes such materials. Id. at 10. In addition, the DOJ’s position
that prosecutors can be prohibited from considering a firm’s rejection of a certain form of
waiver request but can be authorized to consider a firm’s acceptance of the same request is
untenable. See id. at 8-11.
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CONCLUSION
The process of pursuing crime within firms is commonplace and
unavoidable. It affects a large realm of social and economic activity. A variety
of phenomena characterize wrongdoing in the firm setting, including the
influence of legal entities on the commission and sanctioning of criminal acts, a
protracted process of determining criminal responsibility, and special
combinations of lawyers representing various interests and functioning both ex
ante and ex post. Few of the procedural characteristics particular to the
organizational case implicate constitutional law. They arise from, among other
things, privilege law, substantive and vicarious liability regimes, contractual
arrangements, economic incentives, and the nature of the firm. This can and
should be called criminal procedure because it comprises a system regulating
how the state imposes criminal sanctions.
But criminal procedure should be thought of differently in the firm context.
The tripartite model of individual, organization, and state leads to a very
different balancing exercise than does the binary model that has largely
generated our mature law of “traditional” criminal procedure. Recognizing
these foundational differences in context should lead to sensible prescriptions.
Current public debate about criminal procedure within the firm has produced
some misguided proposals, such as to ban the state from encouraging firms to
pursue policies toward their employees and evidence in firms’ control that, as
long as such state practices are appropriately guided and constrained, advance
regulatory objectives without undue cost.

